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March 29, 1982

Mr. Robert A. Scannell
Labor Relations Administrator
Boston Edison Company
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Mass. 02199
Mr. Donald E. Wightman
Secretary-Treasurer
Utility Workers Union of America
120 Bay State Drive
Braintree, Mass. 02184
RE: Award of January 15, 1982
(Donald P. Lydon)
Gentlemen:
You have asked me for clarification of the Award in
the above matter. The question you pose is whether, under the
Award, the Company may require Mr. Lydon to undergo a psychiatric
examination. Based on the particular circumstances of this case;
limited to this case only; and without precedent for any other
matter, my answer is in the affirmative.
The Award authorizes the Company to "require Mr. Lydon
to undergo a medical examination .... to determine his present
competence." In this case a medical examina6tionincludes a
psychiatric examination, and that type of examination is appropriate
in this case to determine his competence for the Lineworker job.
The Union's right to grieve the outcome of any such
psychiatric examination is expressly reserved.
Very truly yours,

EJSthl

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
United Steelworkers of America

and
AWARD

and
ACF Industries, Inc.
Amcar Division (Milton Plant)

The issues are:
(1) Did the Company violate the 1978 and
1981 Collective Bargaining Agreements and
Local Supplements thereto by holding over
second shift employees beyond midnight of
Friday evenings to work into Saturday mornings instead of offering such overtime work
to third shift employees? If so, what shall
be the remedy?; and
(2) Did the Company violate the 1978 Agreement and Local Supplement thereto by requiring, under threat of disciplinary measures, that second shift employees work beyond
midnight of Friday evening into Saturday morning, even though such overtime work had not
been posted by mid shift on the proceeding
Wednesday? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Danville, Pennsylvania on July 7,
1982 at which time ACF Industries, Inc. AMCAR DIVISION (Milton
Plant), hereinafter referred to as the Company, and representatives of the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union 1928,
hereinafter referred to as the Union, appeared.

All concerned

were offered fully the opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and the Company and the Union filed
•
post-hearing briefs.
There are three grievances involved in these proceedings
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all of which involve issues of contract interpretation with
respect to overtime work performed between 12:01 A.M. and 8:00
A.Mo on Saturday mornings.

Grievances Nos. MA80-91 and MA 81-61

are similar in all relevant respects except that the former
arose under the 1978 Collective Bargaining Agreement and Local
Supplement and the latter under the 1981 Agreement and Supplement.

In each instance, the Company held over second shift

employees beyond their regular 4:00 P.M. to Midnight shift on
Friday evening (July 25, 1980 and September 25, 1981, respectively) into Saturday morning (July 26, 1980 and September 26,
1981 respectively).

The Company did not offer such overtime

work to third shift employees, the grievants, even though their
regular weekday shift runs from 12:01 A.M. to 8:00 A.M. which
is the time period during which the Saturday overtime work was
performed by second shift employees.

The Company has established,

and the Union did not contest, that on each occasion second
shift employees were held over in order to complete the normal
production schedule which was disrupted as a result of unanticipated production delays and machine breakdowns which arise
relatively late during the second shift.

Further, in each in-

stance the Company has established and the Union did not contest,
that the Company reasonably anticipated that second shift employees would be held over no more than four hours into Saturday
morning, although with respect to Grievance No. MA 81-61, further
unforeseen breakdowns resulted in five to seven hours of actual

-3overtime work.

The Company contends that in such circumstances

the overtime is akin to "daily" overtime for second shift employees and as such need not be offered to third shift employees
The Union contends that the Company's failure to offer such work
to third shift

employees is in violation of the relevant Agree-

ments between the parties and it seeks appropriate compensation
for the grievants.
The third grievance (No. MA 80-111) was filed by two
second shift employees who refused the Company's "request,"
under threat of disciplinary measures, to work overtime beyond
midnight of the evening of Friday, September 12, 1980 into the
morning of Saturday, September 13, 1980.

The grievants refused

to stay over because the Company did not post notice of such
overtime by midshift of the preceeding Wednesday.

Neither party

introduced any evidence as to the precise circumstances which
led to the Company's "request" to these grievants and its
failure to post prior notice.

However, it is the Union's

position that the Agreements between the parties prevent the
Company from assigning or attempting to assign this overtime
to unwilling employees whenever notice is not posted by the
preceeding Wednesday.

Although these grievants were not disci-

plined in any way for their refusal to work, the Union requests
that the Arbitrator instruct the Company not to force or attempt
to force any employee to work weekend overtime that is not
posted properly.

The Company contends that this overtime is not
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subject to the early notice requirement of the contract since
it is "daily" rather than "weekend" overtime, for second shift
employees.
As the Union is the grieving party in these proceedings,
it has the burden of proving that the Company's conduct violated
the Agreements between the parties.

A thorough review of the

express language of those Agreements and of the evidence of past
practices introduced by the parties persuades me that the Union
has failed to meet its burdens with respect to Grievances Nos.
MA 80-91 and MA 81-61.

I further conclude that Grievance No.

MA 80-111 is non-justiciable.
GRIEVANCES

MA 80-91 and MA 81-61

Art XI, Section 11-1 (b) of the 1978 and 1981 Collective
Bargaining Agreements provides that for the purposes of overtime
pay the:

'•'workday ... is the twenty-four (24) hour
period beginning with the start of the
employee''s regular shift, except that
the calendar day shall apply on Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays in the application of
Sections 11-2, a (4), b (1) and 11-3 below."
Although both parties rely on this clause in support of
their respective contentions, it should be noted that neither
this provision nor any other provision in the Master Agreements
deal with the question of distributing overtime among and between shifts, much less with the specific issue of whether the
Company may hold over the second shift beyond midnight on
Friday evening into Saturday morning for several hours due to
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unexpected and unforeseeable circumstances which arose during
that evening.
The provisions; of the Local Supplement to the 1978 Agreement are similarly ambiguous as applied to the issues in these
proceedings.

The only provision which expressly distinguishes

between daily and weekend overtime is that portion of Section
M-5 which provides that:
"Notice of unexpected daily overtime caused
by production requirements or an emergency
will be given at least twenty-four (24)
hours in advance whenever possible. Notice
of weekend overtime requirements will be
posted by mid-shift on the Wednesday preceeding the weekend. No employee shall be
discriminated against or disciplined because of his failure to work overtime unless
notice of such overtime as specified above
has been given."
However, this language deals only with notification and not
with distribution requirements.

Further, it provides no

definition of daily, as opposed to weekend, overtime work.

The

provision of Section M-5 which does deal with the distribution
of overtime is equally unclear.

The clause provides that over-

time work should first be distributed to:
"employees in the classification, department
and shift in which the work is to be performed...."
The Union's contention that this language clearly mandates that
work which is performed after midnight on Friday evening must
be given to third shift employees is not persuasive for two
reasons.

First, this language is, at the very least, equally

-6-

susceptible to an interpretation which supports the Company's
contention that second shift employees may be given overtime
at the end of their shift in order to complete work which would
and should have been performed during their regular shift but
for unanticipated and unforeseen circumstances.

Second, the

Union's interpretation is inconsistent with the overtime
practices at the Company's plant on Mondays through Thursdays
for all shifts and on Fridays for the first and third shifts.
Both parties agree that it is common practice on those days for
employees to work overtime beyond their normal shifts and into
the next shift to complete disrupted production schedules.
The Union contends that during these occasions, as opposed to
the weekends, no member of the subsequent shift is thereby deprived of any overtime since such employees are then working
their regular hours.

However, to accept the Union's position

would require that I find that the parties drafted a general
provision with respect to the distribution of all overtime which
would, in reality, only apply after midnight on Friday evenings,,
Similarly, the language of the Local Supplement to the
1981 Agreement does not satisfy the Union's burden of proof.
Section M-4 provides in pertinent part:
"Daily overtime work will be distributed in
the following manner:
1. Employees working the job shall be
assigned such overtime work on a daily
basis.

-72. If more employees are required, employees in the classification, department and shift in which the work is to
be performed....in order of seniority....
WEEKEND AND HOLIDAY OVERTIME
1. Employees who normally perform the
work on the shift will be assigned
such overtime work.
2. If more employees are required, employees in the classification and shift
in which the work is to be performed....
in the order of seniority....
Again, it is plausible as not that second shift employees are
those who "normally perform" work past midnight on Friday evening which should and would have been completed before midnight
but for unanticipated production delays arising during the
second shift.

Where, as here, the contract language is

ambiguous, the arbitrator looks for intent and clarification
to past practice.

In that circumstance for the Union to prevail,

a consistent past practice supportive of its case must be shown
The Union has not shown a past practice consistent with
its interpretation of the contract.

Rather the evidence shows

a practice which has been mixed and hence inconclusive.

The

testimony and exhibits introduced by the Union establish
that when the Company has known by the preceeding Wednesday tha
it will require overtime to be performed from 12:01 A.M. to
8:00 A.M. on Saturday, it has scheduled third shift employees
to do that work and has so notified them.

However, that evidence

does not establish such a practice with respect to overtime
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required by events which occur on Friday evening.

The Union

also introduced the testimony of two third shift employees who
testified that on other occasions, including some Friday evenings, the Company called upon them to work after 12:01 A.M.
on Saturdays.

However, these witnesses also admitted that

during these occasions they noticed that second shift employees
were also working.

Although the Union introduced a number of

prior grievances filed by and settled favorably to third shift
employees, all of them but one were expressly settled without
prejudice or precedent.

It is well established that settlement

without prejudice or precedent cannot be utilized to the employer's detriment in these proceedings.

The one grievance

which was not settled without prejudice raised an issue unrelated to the instant matter.
In addition, the Company introduced the unimpeached
testimony of two of its second shift foremen which supports
its position.

Both foremen testified that it was their common

practice to hold over second shift employees on Friday evenings
into Saturday when necessary to meet normal production schedules
which were as the case here, disrupted by unanticipated events
occuring during Friday's second shift.

The Union argues that

it is possible that on all these occasions no third shift employees were deprived of any overtime.

However, in the absence

of any proof to that effect offered by the Union, I find this
contention to be speculative and, therefore, unpersuasive.
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The ambiguity of the pertinent contract language is also
manifest on the question of "fairness."

A finding for the

Company would limit the weekend overtime opportunities for
third shift employees, but it would equalize the daily overtime opportunities for the second shift employees.

Likewise

a ruling for the Union would increase the weekend overtime
opportunities for the third shift but would limit the daily
overtime opportunities of the second shift.

I do not believe

that the parties negotiated this contract language for either
of those conflicting purposes.

Hence the relevant contract

clauses lack clarity.
In short, I find that the Union has failed to establish
that the Company's conduct in holding over second shift employees
beyond midnight on Friday evening in order to complete normal
production schedules which were disrupted as a result of unanticipated delays and breakdowns arising during the second shift
violates either the language of the Agreements or any past
practice interpretative of those contract provisions.

Therefore,

the Union's evidentiary burden under the circumstances of this
case has not been met.
GRIEVANCE NO. MA 80-111
The record indicates that although both grievants were
"requested," under threat of disciplinary measures, to work
overtime, neither did so.

The record also reflects that neither

grievant was or will be disciplined in any manner for their
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failure to work the overtime in question.

Accordingly, neither

has suffered any cognizable injury as a result of the Company's
actions and this grievance is not justiciable.
For the reason stated above, Grievances MA 80-91, MA 80-111
and MA 81-61 are denied.

If any confusion and even possible

inequalities in the distribution of overtime remain, they are
a reflection of the ambiguities in the Agreements negotiated by
the parties and by inconsistencies in past practice.

The cure

for such problems is a matter for collective bargaining, not
arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievances MA 80-91, MA 80-111
and MA 81-61 are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 18, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "'
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
of
ARBITRATORS

Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO
and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by its refusal
to accept the grievant, Donald P.
Lydon for the position of Grade A
Lineworker on P & M posting No. 706.
He shall be considered for and granted
the promotion provided he meets the
conditions set forth in the Opinion of
the Chairman.

Eric/JiSchmertz
Chatirman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring

Robert A. Scannell
Dissenting
DATED: January 15, 1982
STATE OF New York ),ss
COUNTY OF
On this 15th day of January, 1982, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Barbara Porter
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 30-4676 599
Qualified in Nassau County
Commission Expires March 30, 19 ST-
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DATED: January
, 1982
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS ) SSe .
COUNTY OF
)
On this
day of January, 1982, before me personally
came and appeared Donald E. Wightman to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

1982
DATED: January
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS )
ss
COUNTY OF
)
On this
day of January, 1982, before me personally
came and appeared Robert A. Scannell to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its refusal to
accept the grievant, Donald P. Lydon,
for the position of Grade A Lineworker
on P & M posting no. 706? If so, what
shall be the remedy, if any?
A'hearing was held on September 23, 1981 at which time Mr.
Lydon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named parties appeared. Messrs. Robert A.
Scannell and Donald E. Wightman served respectively as the
Company and Union designees to the Board of Arbitration.

The

Undersigned served as Chairman.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Board of

Arbitration met in executive session on December 11, 1981.
I am not persuaded that standing alone, the circumstances
and events of almost twelve years ago, which then barred the
grievant from promotion to the job in question, constitute a
present bar to his contemporary bid for that promotion.

But
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for the ruling of twelve years ago, and the facts at that time,
I do not believe that the grievant's present bid would have been
denied.
The Company has made no new, present or independent judgement of the grievant's present personality or stability and there
is no present evidence that other employees are unwilling to work!
with him on that job.

Rather, the Company relies on the facts

. of twelve years ago when certain fellow employees who would have
been part of the team with the grievant, then refused to work
with him as a Lineworker because they believed him to be a safety
hazard.

.

The record does not show that at the present time any

of those employees would be working with him if he now gained the
promotion.

Nor is there any evidence that in the intervening

years his work on the jobs assigned to him has been unsafe or tha
any employee has refused to work with him.

Nor has the Company

made a current determination based on current facts, other than
the circumstances of twelve years ago, that the grievant would be
a safety hazard if promoted to Lineworker now.
That twelve years ago an arbitrator upheld the Company's
right to then deny the grievant's bid does not mean, in the
absence of contemporary evidence of his continued difficulties
or unacceptability, that the grievant is forever barred from the
promotion, or indeed is barred at this time.
As the job of Lineworker is highly dangerous, and other

employee-members of the work team could be endangered by an unsafe or unstable worker, I am not going to order the Company to
grant the bid and place the grievant on the job forthwith.

In-

stead, the Company may require the grievant to undergo a medical
examination and also to undertake a period of training to prepare
him for the Lineworker job and to determine his present competenc
If he satisfactorily completes the medical examination and a
reasonable period of training he shall then, based on his seniority be entitled to assignment of regular work as a Lineworker.
Under these conditions, his pay as a Lineworker shall begin upon
upon the completion of the training.

The Union's claim for back

pay is denied.

Eric ,,-r. Schmertz
Chairman
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DATED: January 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )tss . :
COUNTY OF New York )

On this 15th day of January, 1982, before me personally came 1
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be !
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
;
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same. !

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-C10

AWARD OF
ARBITRATORS

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above parties makes the following AWARD:
Stipulation No. 1 of the collective bargaining agreement applies to work performed by
Line Workers in the primary zone when the work
is performed utilizing a bucket truck.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring

STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
DATED: May 4, 1982

John J. Godfrey
Dissenting

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
P&M Grievance #2341

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Does Stipulation No. 1 of the collective
bargaining agreement apply to work performed by Line Workers in the primary
zone when the work is performed utilizing
a bucket truck?
A hearing was held on November 2, 1981 in Braintree,
Massachusetts at which time representatives of the above named
parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Undersigned served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration.
Messrs. Donald P. Wightman and John J. Godfrey served respectfully as the Union and Company members of the Board of Arbitration.

The Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

hearing briefs.

The parties filed post-

The Board met in executive session on March 15,

1982.

Under six specified conditions, Stipulation No. 1 reads:
;

Line Workers Working in^Primary Zone of
Overhead Line Installations
Subject to the provisions of the Principal
Agreement between the parties of even date,
and without waiving or modifying any rights
of either party contained therein it is agreed
that the Company will use two (2) Line Workers
(either a combination of two (2) Line Workers A;
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one (1) Line Worker A and one (1) Line Worker
B; or a Leader Overhead Lines with either a
Line Worker A or a Line Worker B) on the same
pole for routine work on live conductors in the
primary zone of overhead line operations under
the conditions outlined below:
The Union claims that when work of the type set forth in
Stipulation No. 1 is performed in the primary zone, two Line
Workers must be used, and that Stipulation No. 1 is applicable
even if the work is performed from a bucket truck.
It is the Company's contention that Stipulation No. 1

.
applies only when the work is performed from and on a pole; that
in the instant case the work was performed by a single Line Worker

i
in a bucket truck, not on or from a pole, and that therefore
:'

Stipulation No. 1 is inapplicable to the instant set of facts.
:-

I agree with the Company that a single Line Worker perform-

i
ing work in a primary zone by use of a bucket truck is no less
safe than if there was a second Line Worker in the same zone in
the other bucket of a double bucket truck, in the bucket of

iI
another single bucket truck or on the pole.

I am persuaded that

if the Line Worker performing the assigned work is injured or
otherwise in danger, he can be brought quickly to the ground for
ji

assistance by the operator of the bucket truck on the ground, and
•

that it would take longer and would be more hazardous for another
Line Worker located in the primary zone to move from one bucket
!

to the other or from the pole to get to the injured or endangered
worker to provide assistance.
However, the matter of practical safety not withstanding,
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I must conclude that by historic development, the Company has
agreed to apply Stipulation 1 to the type of work referred to
in that Stipulation and performed in the primary zone, even if
the work is performed using a bucket truck.

And it is the

contractual obligation which the Arbitrator is required to enforce even if the original safety intent of Stipulation 1 is no
longer present.
It is undisputed that Stipulation 1 was negotiated when work
in the primary zone was performed on and from a pole. Thereafter,
.
bucket trucks, both single and double, were introduced for the
prupose of performing that work.

The record does not support the

•;
•

Company's contention that Stipulation No. 1 has nothing to do with
and does not come into play when a bucket truck is used to perform
Stipulation 1 work in the primary zone.
In April, 1977 the parties modified Stipulation No. 1 with
regard to 4kv work.

I

By agreement that work may be performed in

the primary zone by two Line Workers in buckets or with one in a
bucket and the other on the pole or on the ground.

Clearly the

more modern use of the bucket truck in that circumstance is
synonymous with or a substitute for location of one of the Line
Workers on the pole under the original language of Stipulation 1.
So there was an evolutionary transformation from the pole to the
bucket truck, at least in part.

Hence, the Company's claim that

Stipulation 1 has no applicability to the use of a bucket truck
is untenable.

Moreover, under that supplemental agreement, the
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fundamental provision of Stipulation 1, namely the requirement
that the two Line Workers to be used in the primary zone, was
preserved.

In short with regard to 4kv work the parties mutually

applied the manning provisions of Stipulation 1 to the more modern
use of the bucket truck.

Jl

Even more determinative in my mind is the settlement of
P&M grievance 905 in December, 1969.

That settlement all the more

tied the provisions of Stipulation 1 to work performed in the
primary zone exclusively from bucket trucks.

In that situation

the work was performed by two Line Workers utilizing a double
::

bucket truck.

No Line Worker was positioned on a pole.

Yet the

Company took the position that "Stipulation 1 was complied with
because the two men were always together in the same primary

iI
zone."

With that statement the Company clearly acknowledged that

Stipulation 1 was applicable to work in the primary zone performed
by Line Workers even though the pole was not used. So again the
jl
Company cannot disassociate the use of bucket trucks from
Stipulation 1 just because Stipulation 1 by its original

language

:;

•

relates to work performed on or from a pole.

The Company's

position in that grievance also affirmed the use of two Line
'•

Workers in the same primary zone as complying with the manning
provisions of Stipulation No. 1.

|
Finally the settlement of that grievance expressly provided
• t

that " the Company would not use the double bucket truck to
circumvent the intent or meaning of Stipulation No. 1."

For the

Company now to take the position that Stipulation No. 1 is
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irrelevant to work in the primary zone performed by utilizing a
bucket truck, appears to me to be a circumvention of Stipulation
No. 1 and hence violative of that promise.
This is not a case where the clear, original language of
Stipulation 1, particularly with reference to work done on or
from a pole, is to be enforced irrespective of any past practice
to the contrary.

Rather here, by bilateral agreements, the

parties transformed and expanded the application of Stipulation
No. 1 to later mechanization, namely the instroduction and use
of the bucket truck.

The supplemental agreement with regard to

4kv work and the prior settlement of P&M grievance 905 represent
bilaterally negotiated extensions and refinements of Stipulation
No. 1.

I find that the instant case falls within those agreed

to extensions and refinements.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
May 4, 1982

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
of
ARBITRATORS

Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO
and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by its refusal
to accept the grievant, Donald P.
Lydon for the position of Grade A
Lineworker on P & M posting No. 706.
He shall be considered for and granted
the promotion provided he meets the
conditions set forth in the Opinion of
the Chairman.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Donald E. Wightman
Concurring

Robert A. Scannell
Dissenting
DATED: January 15, 1982
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) * "
On this 15th day of January, 1982, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED: January
, 1982
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS ) ss>:
COUNTY OF
)
On this
day of January, 1982, before me personally
came and appeared Donald E. Wightman to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: January
, 1982
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS )Q Q

COUNTY OF

•

) ' '

On this
day of January, 1982, before me personally
came and appeared Robert A. Scannell to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
forgoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its refusal to
accept the grievant, Donald P. Lydon,
for the position of Grade A Lineworker
on P & M posting no. 706? If so, what
shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held on September 23, 1981 at which time Mr.
Lydon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named parties appeared.

Messrs. Robert A.

Scannell and Donald E. Wightman served respectively as the
Company and Union designees to the Board of Arbitration.

The

Undersigned served as Chairman.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Board of

Arbitration met in executive session on December 11, 1981»
I am not persuaded that standing alone, the circumstances
and events of almost twelve years ago, which then barred the
grievant from promotion to the job in question, constitute a
present bar to his contemporary bid for that promotion.

But
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for the ruling of twelve years ago, and the facts at that time,
I do not believe that the grievant's present bid would have been
denied.
The Company has made no new, present or independent judgement of the grievant's present personality or stability and there
is no present evidence that other employees are unwilling to work
with him on that job.

Rather, the Company relies on the facts

of twelve years ago when certain fellow employees who would have
been part of the team with the grievant, then refused to work
with him as a Lineworker because they believed him to be a safety
hazard.

The record does not show that at the present time any

of those employees would be working with him if he now gained the
promotion.

Nor is there any evidence that in the intervening

years his work on the jobs assigned to him has been unsafe or tha
any employee has refused to work with him.

Nor has the Company

made a current determination based on current facts, other than
the circumstances of twelve years ago, that the grievant would be
a safety hazard if promoted to Lineworker now.
That twelve years ago an arbitrator upheld the Company's
right to then deny the grievant's bid does not mean, in the
absence of contemporary evidence of his continued difficulties
or unacceptability, that the grievant is forever barred from the
promotion, or indeed is barred at this time.
As the job of Lineworker is highly dangerous, and other

-3employee-members of the work team could be endangered by an unsafe or unstable worker, I am not going to order the Company to
grant the bid and place the grievant on the job forthwith.

In-

stead, the Company may require the grievant to undergo a medical
examination and also to undertake a period of training to prepare
him for the Lineworker job and to determine his present competenc
If he satisfactorily completes the medical examination and a
reasonable period of training he shall then, based on his seniority be entitled to assignment of regular work as a Lineworker.
Under these conditions, his pay as a Lineworker shall begin upon
upon the completion of the training.

The Union's claim for back

pay is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: January 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) b':
On this 15th day of January, 1982, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Belltnore Merrick United Secondary
Teachers
and

RULING ON

ARBITRABILITY
Case #1739-0270-81

Bellmore Merrick C.H.S.D.

The threshold issue which the above/named parties have
asked me to decide before going forward with the case on the
merits is whether the Union's grievance on behalf of Patrick
F. Linehan is arbitrable.
There is no question but that the Union did not file the
grievance for arbitration within the prescribed time limits of
Article XXIII Section D Paragraph 4 of the contract.

Not only

was the grievance not submitted to the American Arbitration
Association within the stipulated fifteen days but the eventual
filing by the Union after some fifty-three days cannot be construed as substantial compliance with the time limits.
Yet, under the unique and undisputed facts as represented
by counsel for the Union, I do not think that the merits of the
grievance should be barred from arbitration.
It is well settled that the facts may be within the letter
of the law but not within its spirit and intent.

That is the

case here.
The contract time limits for processing a grievance and
for filing for arbitration, as set forth in Sections B and D
of Article XXIII are in my judgement designed to bar from
arbitration grievances not processed within those limits because
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of the Union's neglect, negligence, ommission, constructive or
overt abandonment of the grievance or other reasons for which
it is at fault or for which it should be held responsible.
In the instant case the Union's untimely filing for
arbitration was beyond its cmtrol, fault, knowledge or
responsibility.

The Union notified its attorneys to submit

the grievance to arbitration in timely fashion.

Union counsel

prepared his demand for arbitration letter to the American
Arbitration Association well within the fifteen day time limit.
The letter was readied for mailing to the Arbitration Associatiot
within the time limit and would have reached the Association
(with a simultaneous copy to the District) within the time limit
Unknown to Union counsel, and unknown to the Union, a
secretary in the office of Union counsel, willfully, secretly,
and apparently maliciously did not place the letter in the mail,
but rather put or hid it in an unseen location in a desk.

Only

after she had been terminated did counsel discover the unmailed
letter.

It was then forwarded to the Arbitration Association.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary I accept Union
counsel's representation of these foregoing facts as truthful
and accurate.
But for a secretive, wrongful and undisclosed act by a
disloyal employee in the office of Union counsel the Union's
grievance would have been filed with the Arbitration Association
within the contractual time limit.

The act that intervened and

-3interfered with the filing of the grievance for arbitration was
unforseen, unforseeable and I conclude undiscoverable sooner by
the Union and Union counsel.

That wrongful act by the secretary

was surely so contrary to her job duties and responsibilities
that she could not be deemed an agent of the Union or even of
Union counsel.
I am not persuaded that the contract time limits were
designed or intended to bar a grievance from arbitration under
such extraordinary if not bizarre circumstances.

Obviously my

ruling is based on the particular facts of this case and
constitutes no precedent for any other situation.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties on the question of arbitrability,
makes the following Ruling:
The Union's grievance on behalf of
Patrick F. Linehan as set forth in
its letter of July 9, 1981, is
arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 4, 1982

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -. — » - , — — — »..»—_»^.«,.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local 2
International Association of Fire
Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC

A W A R D
Case #51 39 0001 81

and
The City of Chicago

Appearances
For the Union
Cornfield & Feldman
by: J. Dale Berry, Esq.
For the City
William B. Hanley & Associates, Ltd.
by: William B. Hanley, Esq.
Gregory J. Schroedter, Esq.
Rockford R. Chrastil, Esq.
In

accordance with Article XX of their collective bargain-

ing agreement the above named Union and City have submitted their
contract issues to arbitration.

The Undersigned was selected as

the "third-member" and Chairman of the arbitration board.

Mr.

Michael Lass and Chief Donald J. Stensland served respectively as
the Union and City representatives on said Board.

Eighteen hearings were held in the City of Chicago over
/

the period from March 3 through June 26, 1961, at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Representatives of the

Operating Engineers, Local 587, AFL-CIO and the Chicago Fire
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Officers Association were permitted to intervene at the
hearings on the issue of Recognition, and filed post-hearing
briefs on that issue.

A stenographic record of the entire

proceeding was taken.

The Union and City filed post-hearing

briefs covering the entire record.

The Chairman wishes to express to Messrs. Lass and
Stensland his deep appreciation for their diligent and constructive participation at the hearings and for their very valuable
counsel and assistance.

However, in accordance with the Arbitra-

tion provisions of Article XX, the Award on the disputed issues
is to be made by the Chairman alone.

In referring to the "third-

member" or Chairman jointly agreed upon by the parties, the
contract states that:
"The terms decided upon by such an
arbitrator shall be included in an
agreement to be submitted to the
City Council for adoption." (Underscoring supplied).

Accordingly the following decisions and Award are those of
the Undersigned as mandated by the foregoing relevant provision
of Article XX.

The record is voluminous.

In studying the evidence and

contentions I have made use of and applied standards which are
well accepted and regularly utilized in public sector "interest"
arbitrations.

They are:

-3(1) comparison of the wages, hours, fringe
benefits, conditions and characteristics
of employment of the public employees involved in the proceeding with the wages, hours,
fringe benefits, conditions and characteristics
of employment generally in public or private
employment in Chicago or comparable communities;
(2) the overall compensation paid to the employees involved in the proceeding, including direct wage compensation, overtime and
premium pay, vacations, holidays and other
excused time, insurance, pensions, medical
and hospitalization benefits, food and apparel
furnished, and all other benefits received;
(3) changes in the average consumer prices for
goods and services, commonly known as the cost
of living;
(4) the employer's ability to pay;
(5) the interest and welfare of the public;
(6) such other factors as are normally and
customarily considered in the determination
of wages, hours, fringe benefits and other
working conditions in collective bargaining
or in such proceedings.
A study of the record before me shows that the detailed,
highly professional and thoroughly competent presentations of
both the City and the Union covered, inter alia, each and all
of the foregoing standards.

Though the entire record and the

relevance of all of the foregoing standards were fully considered
there are some specific factors in connection with some of those
standards which I wish to mention.

Under standard no. 1, I take "judicial notice" as part of
the record of the contract settlement between the City and the

-4Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7 and that historically, in the City of Chicago, there has been economic parity
between the police and the fire fighters.

However I hasten to

add that the police settlement is not and should not be automatically determinative of the contractual agreement between
the City and the Fire Fighters, particularly with regard to
disputed items in arbitration.

If a negotiated settlement be-

tween the City and another union was exclusively determinative
of the terms and conditions of a contract between the City and
the Fire Fighters it would render the impasse, fact-finding
and arbitration provisions of Article XX moot and meaningless
and would frustrate the ability and legal right of both the City
and the Union to freely negotiate a contract related to their
own particular needs and circumstances.

In short, the historic

economic parity between police and fire is a relevant and significant fact to be considered and even resorted to where
probatively appropriate, but standing alone it is not absolute.

With regard to standard 4 I note the inexorable fact of
the calendar, namely that the year 1981, the end of which concludes the arbitrator's authority over the issues in this case,
is drawing to a close.

From the date of this decision only three

and one-half months remain.

The City's budget for 1981 has been

enacted and implemented and the City is faced with serious fiscal
constraints. Juxtaposed and within standard 3 is the fact that
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the increase in wages for the fire fighters in the years 1980
and 1981 have fallen significantly short of the increases in
the cost of living.

Also, the economic cases presented by both sides - the
Union's in support of additional wages and fringe benefits,
and the City's primarily in support of affirmation of what
the employees presently receive - are among the most challenging, technically sound, and comprehensive presented to me in
my twenty years as an arbitrator.

With the marshalling of that

quantity of materially expert evidence, it should not be surpris
ing that merit and even persuasiveness are to be found in both
positions.

With these limited observations, but with consideration
of the full record on the economic issues, it is my judgment
that those issues and differences must be resolved on the basis
of immediate fairness and prudence, leaving to subsequent
negotiations, when time and circumstances are more propitious,
further consideration of legitimate items of significant cost.

Of great importance to me and one of my principal
responsibilities is consideration of Standard 5, "the interest
and welfare of the public."

My view of this arbitration is

that it is a continuation and culmination of the collective
bargaining process.

It is not an isolated or de novo proceeding

separate and apart from the realities of what the parties have

-6already agreed to and the continuity of their collective
bargaining relationship.

My role is to complete the contract

between the parties by deciding those outstanding issues which
they were unable to decide themselves.

Primarily my task is

to use my best judgment on what the parties would have negotiated, or, at the risk of presumptuousness, what the parties
should have negotiated had they been able to agree directly.
This concept has been referred to by me and by others in other
matters as "acceptability."

By that I mean that the arbitra-

tion decision should provide a resolution of the unresolved
issues in a manner with which both sides can live, and if, as
is probable, it is not precisely what they sought one from the
other, it should be a fair enough balance to be acceptable as
the basis for a peaceful continuation of their relationship.

Specifically, with regard to the foregoing, it is not
only in the interest of the parties that the disputed issues
be resolved in a manner acceptable to both, but such resolution
is critical to the public interest.

Decisions which cannot

be accepted by one or both sides may render the orderly
arbitration process useless both now and for the future; may
exacerbate the dispute between the parties; and instead of
producing a peaceful relationship under contract, could provoke
further confrontation.

It is expressly noted that this Award must be adopted by
the City Council.

I am mindful also of the strike which pre-
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ceded the current contract.

An arbitration decision on the un-

resolved issues should not be so radical or unpredictable as to
render it unacceptable, giving rise thereby to the possibility
of a failure to adopt, or another strike or other dislocations
inimical to the public interest and the interests of the
parties.

Accordingly, with due regard to the full record before
me and with the application of the foregoing standards to that
record, I have made decisions and an Award which in my judgment
represent fair, realistic and equitable answers to the disputed
issues for the short contract term involved.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in
accordance with Article XX of the contract and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
makes the following AWARD:

1• Jurisdiction and Scope of Arbitration
The Arbitrator's jurisdiction is limited
to the calendar year 1981.
Therefore
those issues or parts thereof including
economic issues which relate to the year
1980 are denied and dismissed as to that
year.
2. Recognition
The petition of the Operating Engineers
Local 587 for exclusion of employees in
the engineer classification from the
bargaining unit represented by Local 2
is denied. There is no claim that the
engineer is supervisory, managerial or

-8confidential. Rather he is an integral
part of the suppression force, working
as a member of the fire fighting team
with employees in the fire fighter classification with whom has has an obvious
community of interest. Therefore the employees in the engineer classification
shall be included in the bargaining unit
represented by Local 2.
The City does not contend that fire
officers of the ranks lieutenant through
battalion chief should be denied collective bargaining rights. Indeed it is the
City's contention that those officers may
be represented in collective bargaining
by the Fire Officers Association. In the
absence of any claim that officers of those
ranks should be denied collective bargaining rights, the question of which union
should represent them should be left to a
secret ballot, self-determination election.
Therefore an election conducted by the
American Arbitration Association shall be
held among the officers of the ranks lieutenant
through battalion chief as a single group
on the question of whether, as a group, they
wish to be represented by Local 2, Chicago
Fire Fighters Union or by the Chicago Fire
Officers Association. The outcome of that vote
by a majority of those casting ballots shall
determine whether the officers of those ranks
shall or shall not be included in a bargaining
unit represented by Local 2.
In addition to the foregoing, Local 2 shall
be recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for uniformed members of
the Chicago Fire Department who are below the
rank of lieutenant and for those full-time employees of the Bureau of Emergency Services
below the rank of paramedic-in-charge.

3. Wages
In addition to the wage increase already
received for 1981, employees in this bargaining unit shall receive an across-the-board
wage increase of two per cent (2%) effective
September 1, 1981.
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4. Uniform Allowance
Employees shall receive a supplemental uniform allowance of $250 upon adoption of
this Award and an additional supplemental
payment of $150 on December 15, 1981.
5. Overtime
Effective December 1, 1981 employees shall
receive overtime pay at the rate of time
and one-half for work performed beyond regularly
scheduled tours. The City's managerial rights
to make and enforce rules regarding employee
latenesses or other gratuitous and/or informal
periods of time off during regular working
hours, are reserved.
6. Recall
Employees who are recalled under Section 5.4
of the contract shall receive a minimum of
two hours pay at time and one-half effective
December 1, 1981,
7. Personal Day
The contract shall provide for one personal
leave day for each employee each year commencing October 1, 1981.
Employees shall
not be required to work on a personal day
provided that written notice of the personal
day is given to the appropriate superior no
later than ten days prior to the personal day;
provided further that a contractual specified
holiday may not be selected as a personal day,
and that the granting of the personal day does
not adversely effect Department operations.
8. Dental Plan
Effective December 31, 1981 the present Dental
Plan covering employees shall be extended to
provide dental coverage for all dependents of
employees covered by this agreement, the cost
of such dependent coverage to be borne by the
City.
9. Manning
The vehicle and equipment manning complements
established after the strike and which are
currently maintained shall continue to be
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maintained at those levels for the
balance of this contract term .
10. Mileage Allowance
The City's proposal of a mileage allowance
of 18 cents per mile is granted and shall
be the rate set forth in the contract.
11. Residency
The contract clause on Residency shall
read :
"All employees covered by this Agreement
shall be actual residents of the City of
Chicago."
My interpretation of the foregoing is that
in an arbitration the Union may not challenge
the validity of the residency law or requirement. However it may assert that an employee
discharged for failure to meet the residency
requirement was not discharged for "just cause"
if it can be shown that other City employees
similarly situated who also fail to comply
with the residency requirement were either
not discharged or suffered lesser penalties.
In that circumstance the factual questions
together with the question of just cause and
whether the discharge was discriminatorily
based are matters for the arbitrator.
12. Union Business Leaves
Union officials or representatives shall
receive paid time off to attend bargaining
sessions, membership meetings or executive
board meetings scheduled and conducted at
reasonable times and intervals. However if
at those times the City is unable to obtain
a relief man to cover for the Union official,
the minimum manning provisions of the contract
for no more than one man of that prescribed
complement shall be waived.
13. Longevity
The Union's demands with regard to longevity
are denied except for that portion relating
to the loss of longevity increases upon
promotion in rank. The contract shall con-

-11tain a provision under which an employee who is promoted does not lose
a longevity wage increase on the anniversary date of his employment in the
Department. The current practice of
dropping a promoted employee back to a
lower longevity step shall be discontinued
effective October 1, 1981.
14. Holiday Pay
Effective July 1, 1981 employees covered
by this contract who work on any of the
twelve recognized City holidays shall
receive credit for compensatory time off
for the full period of the time worked.
Also, employees who so work shall receive
additional pay in an amount equal to onehalf of the time worked on the holiday at
their straight time rate.
15.

All other unresolved issues submitted to
and within the authority of this arbitration
are determined as follows:
a. The portions of said issues that are
agreed upon are affirmed and shall be
incorporated in the contract.
b. The portions of said issues that remain
in dispute are denied and dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the parties
in subsequent contract negotiations and/or
in any other forum which may have jurisdiction.
c. Those issues totally in dispute are deferred
to and for negotiations of the contract commencing January 1, 1982 with the respective
rights of the parties reserved. On those issues
the status quo shall obtain for the year 1981 as
required by the Arbitration provisions of
Article XX of the contract.

16.

All issues which the parties were able to resolve through direct negotiations and all
contract provisions of the predecessor agreement which are not subject to this Award or
changed by direct negotiations shall be continued
and incorporated in the contract for the period
January 1, 1981 through December 31, 1981.
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17.

The Undersigned retains jurisdiction for
the interpretation, application and/or
implementation of all the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 15, 1981
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this fifteenth day of September, 1981, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledge to
me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local 2,
International Association of Fire
Fighters, AFL-CIO

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
The City of Chicago

The issue is the claim of the above named Union that:
The fair share fee provisions of the 1981
collective bargaining agreement (Article
III Sections 3.IB and 3.2) be effective
retroactively to January 1, 1981 for fire
department employees classified as engineers
and officers of the ranks Lieutenant, Captain,
Battalion Chief.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in Chicago, Illinois on July 29, 1982,
at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator permitted counsel for a group of fire
officers to appear and participate in the hearing in an amicus
capacity.

No representative of affected engineers appeared, nor

did any employee of that classification, though due notice of
the hearing was served on all concerned.
A stenographic record was taken and briefs were filed.
As the parties know, there are no public sector labor
laws in Chicago or in the State of Illinois which control this
situation.

However, I conclude that public rulings from other

jurisdictions and the decisions under the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, though not binding, are relevant and appropriate
guides.

As the Union recognizes in its brief, those rulings and
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decisions support the City's position in this case.
Considering these guides, my interest arbitration Award
and the contract between the parties, I am simply not persuaded
that the engineers, Lieutenants, Captains and Battalion Chiefs
should be required to pay dues or a fair share fee prior to the
point it had been legally determined that they are part of the
bargaining unit represented by Local 2 and covered by the collective bargaining agreement between Local 2 and the City of Chicago
The parties negotiated and agreed to the fair share contract provision.
arbitration case.

It was not an issue or a part of my interest
At the time, the parties knew that the

engineers and the affected fire officers contested inclusion in
the bargaining unit and therefore knew that the date of the
effectiveness of the fair share clause, or indeed its effectiveness at all to those classified employees, was still in doubt,
dependent on my rulings on the scope of the unit.

To make the

mandatory effectiveness retroactive to January 1, 1981, in the
face of traditional decisional law to the contrary, would require
in my view, an express provision in the fair share clause to that
effect.

No such explicit condition was obtained by the Union and

none was agreed to or included.
The effective and retroactive dates, which I fixed in my
interest Award applied to the issues I decided and not necessaril
or automatically to issues not before me.

As to the latter issue

including the fair share fee, the effective dates were the
responsibility of the parties.'
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Under the foregoing circumstances I am not able to rule
that either under my Award or the contract, the fair share clause
is or was intended to be made mandatorily retroactive to January
1, 1981, when it was not until months later that the affected
employees were ruled to be within the bargaining unit.

If the

contract effective date leads to a different conclusion, as
asserted by the Union, I cite the well settled axiom that "a
thing may be within the letter of the contract but not within
its spirit and intent."

I am persuaded that that is what we

have here.
The determination that the engineers are part of the
bargaining unit represented by Local 2 was made by my Award
dated September 15, 1981.

I consider the subsequent approval of

that Award by the City Council to be an affirmation and ratification of my ruling as of the date the Award was rendered. Therefore I rule that September 15, 1981 is the effective date for
the application of and required compliance with the fair share
provisions of the contract for and by employees classified as
engineers.
The determination that offices of the ranks Lieutenant,
Captain and Battalion Chief are part of the unit was made with
my announcement of the results of the self-determination election
on November 15, 1981.

I deem the subsequent official certifica-

tion of those results by the American Arbitration Association to
be confirmation of the election results as of November 15.
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Therefore I rule that November 15, 1981 is the effective date
for the application of and required compliance with the fair
share provisions of the contract for and by officers of the
ranks Lieutenant, Captain and Battalion Chief.
Fair share payments by engineers and/or Lieutenants,
Captains, and/or Battalion Chiefs prior to the aforementioned
effective dates are deemed voluntarily made and may not be
recouped.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 15, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

July 6, 1982

Dean R^lph feslick
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Dental School
Rutherford, New Jersey 07070
Professor Du-ne Edwards
Department of Tnglish
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Rutherford, New Jersey 07070
RE: AJVUP -and- Fr-irleigh Dickinson
University (Professor Alan V.nil)
Dear Deon K^slick .~nd Professor Edwards:
I h~ve given careful thought to the approach we discussed
at our recent Judiciary Board meeting for the decision in the .above
matter.
I have now concluded that that Approach -^nd contract basis
do not square with my view of the facts and applicable contract provisions in this case.
Accordingly I am x^riting the decision as I see it and, in
accordance with my usual procedures in tripartite situations, will
forward it to you in the next few days for your consideration,
concurrence and/or dissent.
Sincerely,

Eric J. -Schmertz
Chairman
EJS:hl

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Clearview Nursing Home, Shore View
Nursing Home and Sea Crest Health
Care Center
and

OPINION AND AWARD

Local 144, S.E.I.U.
The stipulated issues:, are:
1. Under the applicable collective bargaining
agreement, how much is owed by each Home to
each of the .Funds as of September 27, 1981?
2. Shall any of this indebtedness be reduced
by any contractual or arbitral credits? If so,
by how much?
3. How shall the remaining indebtedness be
paid?
4. What shall be the terms and conditions of
the collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and Sea Crest Health Care Center?
A hearing was held on October 14, 1981 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oa.th v/as
waived. The parties submitted post-hearing data.
With regard to issue #1, it appears, based on the posthearing data submitted that the parties, with the assistance of
representatives of the Funds, are in agreement and have stipulated
the indebtedness of the Homes and facilities to the various Funds.
For reasons stated hereinafter, I make no determination on the
accuracy of those figures and/or stipulations, but rather leave
to the parties and to the representatives of the Funds the calculations of those debts.
With regard to that portion of Issue #2 dealing with forgiveness other than the "30% forgiveness", of indebtedness due
the Funds and in explanation, of the foregoing statement, I have
concluded after careful study and consideration, the provisions
of my Award of May 20, 1980 notwithstanding, that for the
arbitrator to grant any relief from or forgiveness of any indebtedness presently due the Funds (or due as of September 27, 1981)
would put the arbitrator in the position, of a Trustee of the
Funds. Based on present interpretations of ERISA the arbitrator
under that circumstance could be subject to the same fiduciaryduties and liabilities of a Trustee. But unlike the Trustees

the arbitrator is not covered by the Trustee's insurance or bond
and is unable to acquire insurance protecting him from that
potential personal liability.
Aside from the "30?o forgiveness" clause of the contract,
the matter of any other forgiveness of monies due the Funds is
not a contract issue between the Union and the Employers. It
does not call for an interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreements. Rather, in my view, changes in the
present indebtedness to the Funds is a matter for the Trustees
of the Funds or for agreement of the Union and Employer, then
adopted or affirmed by the Trustees.
This petition arises from the Arbitration Av/ard of May 20,
1980 between the Union and Sea Crest. That Award provides inter
alia, that
"on or before March 31, 1981 the Employer
may petition the Arbitrator for forgiveness"
Irrespective of any "consideration" or "quid pro quo"
which Sea Orest may have granted to the Union within and as part
of that Av/ard, I am now of the view that to grant the forgiveness
requested could create a potential personal liability for me
under ERISA for the amounts of any forgiveness granted, whether
or not I have the authority to deal with the issue posed.
It is noted that that Av/ard is between the Union and Sea
Crest. As the other two Homes were not parties to that case
there is not even a "color of authority" with regard to them.
I appreciate and thank the Employer and his Association
for the inclusion in my retainer agreement as Impartial Chairman,
of a "hold-harmless" clause and a promise to reimburse for
liabilities arising from the Arbitrator's acts, including
personal fiduciary liability under SRISA. With sincere due
respect to the persons involved I am not certain about the
enforceability of those provisions. More to the point is my
strong disinclination to be put in the position of requesting
or seeking enforcement.
I do not wish to be subject to a suit
bv any of the Trustees, by employees covered by the Funds, or
to an inquiry or possible suit by the United States Department
of Labor. That I might ultimately prevail by showing that I
should not be treated as a fiduciary or that I did not breach a
fiduciary duty; or that I might ultimately be made whole by the
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Employer (or his Association) for any monetary liability, begs
the problem and are not satisfactory answers.
-Therefore I respectfully decline to deal with the question
of general forgiveness of the indebtedness of the Homes to the
Funds. Under that circumstance it is unnecessary for me to
consider or to determine in an Award how much the Homes owe the
"Funds or how that indebtedness is to be paid. The rights of all
parties concerned on those matters, are reserved.
Also, in. view of the ERISA inhibitions on the arbitrator,
it is unnecessary for me to determine whether there was an agreement between Sea Crest and the Union for this type of forgiven.es
in exchange for "up-front" payments to the .Funds, a pay-out plan,
and retroactive wage increases for the employees. With the right
of the Union and Sea Crest reserved, Sea Crest may in a different
proceeding assert the existence of such an agreement or show that
even if no such agreement was expressly reached, it had reasonable grounds to believe that there was to be such an arrangement
and save certain considerations Tfor it.. In that, event Sea Crest
bargaining credit
may be entitled to a "collective/or equitable adjustment" as an
offset against costs it may otherwise and later occur in
collective bargaining with the Union on bargainable terms and
conditions of a subsequent collective bargaining contract. As
Impartial Chairman. I shall retain jurisdiction, to consider that
possible eventuality.
With regard to that part of issue #2 dealing with the
petition, for "30/o forgiveness'5, I do have arbitral authority
as that benefit is part of the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties, and its grant or denial requires the interpretation and/or application of the contract. The "30% forgivenej
provision had its origin, in my mediator, /factfinder recommendati
which were accepted by the Union and the employers and which
became part of their collective bargaining agreement.
In. an advisory opinion by the Department of Labor involving
this Arbitrator and this Industry, the Department held that
where the arbitrator interprets or applies the collective bargai
ing agreement on a matter affecting the Funds (in that case
whether the contractual contribution rate was to be 5% or 8-g?q),
the arbitrator was not a fiduciary. In that circumstance the
arbitrator dealt with a collective bargaining issue and was
authorized to legislate on a matter over which the Union and the
employers had a right to bargain.
Clearly the fixing of a prospective contribution rate as
part of the contract is totally different from excusing an. employer from an indebtedness to the Funds accumulated under
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previously determine contract terras.
However, I shall reserve and defer decision on the "30;£
forgiveness petition." 'That forgiveness was contractually
premised on specific requirements. Principal among them is the
requirement that the employer "remain current" in his pay-out
arrangements and in meeting current contributions to the Funds.
The Employers in this case did not meet those requirements
precisely. Whether that is fatal to their petition is somethin.
1 will determine after I have learned what the balance or bulk
of the Homes in the Industry have done.
It may be that circumstances were such for the Industry
generally that I would not require absolute and unvaried
compliance.
Then, again I may require specific performance of
the conditions.
In. short, 1 do not want the petitions of these three Home
prejudiced by the absence of evidence of the experience of
others, nor do I want the instant petitions to set the standard
for the entire Industry.
I have before me now the petitions of over 50 Homes and
facilities represented by the Greater Hew York. Health Care
Facilities Association for the "30% forgiveness" under the same
contractual provisions an.d conditions as are applicable in the
instant case. That petition, together with the evidence submitted in the instant case by the three Employers herein and
the evidence and arguments of the Union, should provide me with
the information I seek to make definitive rulings on the "30"^
forgiveness" issue, which would then apply Industry-wide.
Therefore until then I reserve decision on that question in the
instant case.
In response to issue #4 the terms and conditions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Sea Crest
Health Care Center on. the issues in dispute, for which I understand Sea Crest has received or is in the process of receiving
an appropriate Medicaid reimbursement rate adjustment from the
State, shall be
1. The contract term shall be from April
1, 1981 to March 31, 1
2.

The dates on which the wage increases
shall be implemented and the amount of
such increases per week are:

-5Blue Collar
LPN

RN

;|26
26
26

4/1/82
15
15
15

1Q/1/32
10
12.50
15

4/1/83
15
15
15

10/1/83
10

12. ~50
1,5

All wage Increases shall be added to the minimum rates of pay,
3.

Transt) or t a. 1 1 on All o wan eg
Effective 4/1/81
Effective 4/1/82

4.

$1.25 per week
12.50 per week

LFM Vacations
one-half week after six (6) months
three weeks after one (l) year

Effective O tober 1, 1983 contributions
to the Loca 144 Nursing Home Pension
Pund , shall be increased by one (l/o percent of the gross payroll of all bargaining unit employees.
Effective 0 tober 1, 1983 contribu ions to
the Welfare Pund shall be increased by one
(1/0 percent of the gross payroll of all
bargaining unit employees.
Gross payroll shall be frozen, at the rates
of pay in effect on September 30, 1980 for
a period of sixteen. (16) months.

6. All other terms of the current Agreement between, the parties shall remain, in full force
and effect unless modified by provisions of
this Award.
The parties further agree that with the
changes contained in this Award and the Award
dated May 20, 1980, the November 22, 1977
Agreement between the parties, shall be extended through March 31, 1984. If the parties
fail to reach settlement of a subsequent agreement before the expiration of that Agreement, the
parties shall submit all outstanding issues to
binding arbritration before Eric J. Schmertz.
However, in the event the said Arbitrator's
Award grants any increases, said increases
and effective dates of said increases shall
not be above and beyond those increases contained
in the Master Agreement.
7.

The expiration date of the successor agreement shall be extended for the identical length
and term as the relationship of this agreement
to the Master Agreement between Local 144 and
Southern. New York Residential Health Care
Facilities Association, Inc.

December 28, 1981
Cancun, Mexico

Er i c J . "'Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Council of American Association
of University Professors Chapters

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
Fairleigh Dickinson University

In accordance with Article 15 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated September 1, 1979 through August 31, 1982 between
the Fairleigh Dickinson University Council of American Association
of University Professors Chapters, hereinafter referred to as the
"Association" and Fairleigh Dickinson University, hereinafter
referred to as the "University," the Undersigned was selected as
the Chairman of an ad hoc

judiciary, to hear and decide, together

with designees of the Association and the University, the following stipulated issue:
Whether Dr. Harry Marmion's action with
respect to Professor Alan Vail's application for tenure violated the collective bargaining agreement? If so what
shall be the remedy under the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement?
A hearing was held at the University's campus in Rutherford,
New Jersey on June 15, 1982 at which time Professor Vail, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
Association and University appeared.

Dean Ralph Kaslick and

Professor Duane Edwards served respectively as the University and
Association members of the Judiciary.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
was waived.

The Oath of the members of the Judiciary

-2-

Article 11.22(m) reads:
In the event that the CFSC and the College
Dean concur, the Vice President for Academic
Affairs shall approve their recommendations,
except in unusual circumstances for compelling
reasons which shall be stated in writing and
forwarded to the College Dean, the CFSC, the
department, and the affected faculty member.
The reasons must arise from overriding
University-wide concerns with respect to enrollment patterns, class sizes, curriculum
or discipline needs, and specific faculty
status criteria found elsewhere in this
Agreement.
What Dr. Marmion, the University's Vice President for Academic
Affairs did, was to reject the recommendation of the College
Faculty Status Committee and the College Dean of the School of
Business Administration that the grievant be granted tenure.

Dr.

Marmion's reasons for doing so are set forth in his letter of
June 2, 1981 to the grievant which reads in pertinent part:
It is my judgement that the granting of
tenure would represent a failure to comply with the Agreement, specifically the
faculty status criteria described in
Article 8.32(e). The absence of the doctorate, combined with a lack of "evidence
of such continuing preparation, study, research, publication, or other scholarly or
creative activity appropriate to the discipline and continuing professional growth"
(Article 8.32(e)(3)), constitute compelling
reason for my not accepting the recommendation of the CFSC and the Dean.
In short, Dr. Marmion's action was to reject the recommendation for tenure because the grievant did not possess a doctorate
degree and had not published or shown evidence of scholarship in
his discipline as a Professor of Accounting.
Article 8.32(e) reads:
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(e) The following are criteria for tenure:
(1) Demonstrated ability to teach effectively and to maintain high academic
standards.
(2) Appropriate academic degrees and, where
applicable, other certifications.
(3) Evidence of such continuing preparation, study, research, publication, or
other scholarly or creative activity
appropriate to the discipline and consistent with continuing professional
growth.
(4) The fulfillment of other professional
responsibilities (Section 7.9).
(5) Contribution to the welfare,of the
students through counseling, advising,
and similar activities.
(6) Service to the University.
It is acknowledged that Professor Vail satisfactorily met criteria
one, four, five and six.
In my opinion the issue narrows to whether Dr. Marmion
properly rejected the concurring recommendations of CFSC and the
College Dean "for compelling reasons...(which) arise from overriding University-wide concerns with respect to enrollment patterns
class sizes, curriculum or discipline needs, and specific faculty
status criteria found elsewhere in this Agreement."
Indeed, because Dr. Marmion relies on the criteria set forth
in Article 8.32(e), i.e. the grievant's lack of a doctorate and the
absence of scholarly research and publications the issue further
narrows to whether his action was proper on the grounds of
"criteria found elsewhere in this Agreement" within the meaning
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of Article 11.22(m) of the contract.
I conclude that Dr. Marmion's reasons were not "unusual
circumstances for compelling reasons" within the meaning of
Article 11.22(tn).

Hence I find that with regard to the concurring

recommendations of the CFSC and the College Dean he was bound to
the mandatory

language of that provision which reads:

"The Vice President for Academic Affairs
shall approve their recommendations..."
(emphasis added).
I do not find Article 8.32(e) to be clear.

Its ambiguity

involves the question of whether an applicant for tenure must fulfill all six requirements.
that claim in this case.

Dr. Marmion and the University make

However the contract is not so explicit

and not subject to that single interpretation.

The introduction

to 8.23(e) reads :
The following are criteria for tenure:
It does not say that all and each must be met nor is there the
word "and" linking each of the six standards together.

It is well

settled that an ambiguous contract provision is clarified as to
meaning and intent by the manner in which it has been applied and
implemented by the parties.

In this regard the Association's

contention, supported by virtually all the witnesses called by the
University, is that a candidate for tenure need not meet all and
each standard but rather is eligible for tenure if, as in this
case, he satisfies most of them, with demonstrated
least two or three areas.

strength in at

That the grievant not only met four of

the six standards but also demonstrated strength in teaching
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ability and service to the University is unquestioned.
^

And, based

again on the testimony involving University witnesses, it has been
regular and consistent past practice to grant tenure on that basis
to other faculty members of the School of Business Administration.
Accordingly, the University's assertion that all six standards must
be met is not supported by the explicit language of the contract
nor by the implementation of that language in past cases.

Under

those circumstances Dr. Marmion erred when he relied on Article
8.32(e)(3) of the contract in rejecting the recommendation that
the grievant be granted tenure.
Dr. Marmion also erred in his reliance on Article 8.32(e)(2).
For three specific reasons the grievant should not have been rejected for tenure because he did not possess a doctorate degree.
First, it is undisputed that when he was hired he was told by a
predecessor Vice President for Academic Affairs that his CPA/MBA
were terminal degrees and would suffice for tenure.

Second, Dr.

Marmion conceded in his testimony that there was an "ambiguity"
concerning whether the CPA/MBA was a terminal degree. He stated
that "some people thought that it was adequate for tenure."

And

third, other professors of accounting in the School of Business
Administration were granted tenure possessing only the CPA/MBA
degrees. For these reasons it was improper and unfair for the
niversity to require the grievant to possess a doctorate degree
at the time of his petition for tenure.
Nor in my judgement may the University rely on "overriding
University-wide concerns with respect to...specific faculty status
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criteria..."

Nowhere in this case has the University shown that

the tenure procedures and standards in any of its other Schools
or disciplines have been different from or more demanding than
the practices followed by the School of Business Administration.
This is not to say that the University should not be interested
in or even require that applicants for tenure throughout the
University be required to possess doctorate degrees and demonstrat
scholarship through publications and research.

Indeed any such

requirement is both understandable and commendable for a
University seeking to improve its educational stature.

Rather,

it is to say that the University has not shown in this particular
case that only the School of Business Administration has not met
University-wide criteria or that other Schools and disciplines
have applied the contract the way Dr. Marmion and the University
apparently desire.

Though Dr. Marmion's efforts to raise tenure

qualifications are salutory, those efforts, based on the record
in this case, are not founded on the conditions in Article 11.22
(m) of the contract which constitute exceptions to the requirement
that he approve the concurring recommendations of the CFSC and the
College Dean.

Accordingly Dr. Marmion should have affirmed that

recommendation and recommended to the President of the University
and/or the Board of Trustees of the University that the grievant
be granted tenure.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Council of American Association
of University Professors Chapters

AWARD

and
Fairleigh Dickinson University

The Undersigned, duly designated as the ad hoc Judiciary
pursuant to Article 15.53 of the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of said parties, make the following AWARD:
Dr. Harry Marmion's action with respect
to Professor Alan Vail's application for
tenure violated the collective bargaining agreement. This Judiciary recommends
to the President of the University and/or
to the Board of Trustees of the University
that Professor Vail be granted tenure.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Duane Edwards
Concurring

DATED: July 6, 1982
STATE OF New York)gg .
COUNTY OF New York)

Ralph Kaslick
Dissenting

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982
)ss .
)

I, Duane Edwards do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982
)
' cc *
) * '

I, Ralph Kaslick do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
General Dynamics Corporation
(Electric Boat Division)
and

OPINION AND AWARD
MDA 192-82
MDA 194-82

Marine Draftmen's Association
Port of New London

The parties were unable to stipulated a precise issue.
Based on the entire record I deem the issue to be:
Whether under the collective bargaining agreement there was just cause for the discharge of
Donald Farrar? If not what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in New London, Connecticut on July
12 and July 23, 1982 at which time Mr. Farrar, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the
above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Company claims that in response to a verbal warning,
the grievant was guilty of disrespectful, abusive and threatening conduct to supervisor Carl Kiely.
The grievant denies the charge; asserts that he was denied
his contract and "Weingarten" rights to Union representation
when Kiely gave him a warning relating to his work performance;
that the warning was unjustified; and that the Company acted
in retaliation for his prior strike activity.
Certain contentions in this case are immaterial.

Whether

the grievant was entitled to Union representation under
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"Weingarten" is not a contract issue but a matter for a
different forum.

In this proceeding the grievant's right

to representation in a disciplinary setting is controlled
by the contract.

Also, whether the warning was verbal or

written and whether or not it was for just cause, are also
immaterial.

Either way the grievant would not have been

justified in responding in an intemperate, disrespectful,
abusive or threatening manner.

He is a Union counselor

and knows or should know that any such mistakes by the Company
can and would be redressed under the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract and that "self help" in the
form of a personal confrontation with a supervisor is both
unnecessary and impermissable.
The question therefore narrows to what took place between the grievant and Kiely.

I find the testimony of the

latter to be more credible.
On issues of credibility, other events and incidents
may be relevant.

Here, in a prior and different situation,

where the grievant admittedly assaulted a truck driver who
drove a truck through or by the Union picket line, the
grievant's explanation and attempted justification of that
act is implausible and hence unbelievable.

His claim that

the driver drove the truck up his leg from his foot to about
his knee forcing him backward onto the ground is, in my view,
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physically impossible.

I find that explanation to be con-

trived and, I judge, designed to hide the grievant's short
temper and propensity for violence.

As I cannot accept his

explanation for that earlier act, I cannot accept his denial
of his words and conduct in the meeting with Kiely giving
rise to the instant discharge.
However, though for reasons already stated the grievant
cannot be excused and is clearly subjectto discipline, I
conclude that the ultimate penalty of discharge is too severe.
I am not persuaded that Kiely felt as physically
threatened or as fearful of his physical safety as he claims.
Apparently both men have had these types of verbal confrontations with each other before and it was not an unprcedented
part of their working relationship.

There is no evidence that

any of these verbal altercations resulted in physical violence
and there is no probative evidence that the grievant was
previously disciplined or cautioned for his part in those
confrontations.
Also, the circumstances leading to the confrontation
contain some mitigating factors.

There is some question in

my mind about the propriety of the warning which Kiely gave
the grievant and which triggered the grievant's outburst.
Based on the record it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the grievant's failure to carry out the work assignment as
directed was more a result of misunderstanding and poor
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communication than neglect or disregard.

Again, this is

not to excuse his subsequent conduct but rather to say that
but for a warning of questionable validity the events that
followed would not have occurred.
Finally, considering the foregoing together with the
grievant's sixteen years of employment, I think that the
proper discipline at this point is not discharge but suspension.
But the grievant is warned that further misconduct would, in
the opinion of this Arbitrator, be grounds for dismissal.
Accordingly the Undersigned duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Donald Farrar is reduced
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated
without back pay. The period from his discharge to his reinstatement shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension for misconduct.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 11, 1982
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of America, Local 493

OPINION AND AWARD
MTC 2029A-8

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company equalize the assignment of
overtime work for warehousemen on the first
shift in accordance with the contract and
addenda thereto beginning November 12, 1977?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Groton, Connecticut on July 18,
1979 and September 28, 1981, at which time General Dynamics
Corporation, (Electric Boat Division), hereinafter referred
to as the Company, and representatives of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
of America, Local 493, hereinafter referred to as the Union,
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
A stenographic record was taken and the Company and Union filed
post-hearing briefs.

In addition, this Arbitrator conducted an

on-site inspection aboard the 688 class submarine.
CONTRACTUAL

PROVISIONS

Article X, Section 6 of the 1975-79 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, as modified by the Memorandum of Understanding, dated
January 28, 1977, between the Metal Trades Council of New London
County and the Company, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement,
provides that:
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"It is the intent of the parties that all
overtime work shall be divided equally
among employees within an occupational
title in each shift....except as provided
by the succeeding sections."
Article X, §8, defines "inequality" as a variance in
excess of sixteen (16) credited overtime premium hours within
each category of the respective occupational title.
However, Section 6B(2) provides the following exception
to the equality requirement:
"For...employees...who are not capable of
performing particular function(s) within
their occupational title, their overtime
work shall be divided equally within the
work function(s) which they are capable
of performing on a yardwide (Employer's
Facilities) basis."
In the event that there is an inequality in the distribution of overtime hours, the local union is to notify the
Company in writing.

The Company then has six (6) months to

equalize the overtime within the cited category of the occupational title.

If the cited inequality is not corrected, the

local union may then file a grievance for those employees who
have not been equalized.

After the filing of such a grievance,

the Company has an additional ninety (90) days to equalize those
employees.

If it has failed to properly equalize during the

total ninth month period, the Agreement provides that "The
Employer shall remunerate to make whole only those employees
who have not been equalized," in accordance with the following
formulae:
"Where the inequality is fifty (50) overtime premium hours credited or less, the
company liability shall be determined as
follows:

-3Total overtime hours paid for the employes'
overtime category, divided by the total number of eligible employes within the overtime
category, less total overtime hours credited
to such each employe(s), multiplied by such
individual's rate at the time of filing the
grievance.
Where the inequality is greater than fifty
(50) overtime premium hours credited, the
Company liability shall be determined as
follows:
The employe shall be made whole by payment
to him of an amount equal to the total overtime premium hours credited to the highest
employe within the category, minus the sum of
sixteen (16) overtime premium hours and the
employe's total overtime premium hours credited,
multiplied by such individual's rate at time
of filing the grievance."
In addition, in 1977 the Metal Trades Council and the
Company agreed to certain matters relating to overtime equalization.

On April 1, 1977, Anthony L. DeGregory, President of the

MTC, wrote to the Company: (hereinafter the "DeGregory letter").
His letter stated in pertinent part:
"Another point of concern that should be
addressed is assignments away from the
Employer's Facilities (e.g. Spain, Scotland,
etc.). In the past week or so, it has been
suggested to me by management that these
assignments would be, or should be, excluded
from the overtime tab runs. This is not part
of the Agreement....
It is realized by the parties that these assignments may result in temporary inequalities.
This could also happen within certain work assignments within the facilities. As far as the MTC
is concerned, when these situations arise, the
local unions should cite the inequality and the
Company should document the reason(s) why this
inequality could not be avoided and notify the
Local Union and this office in writing. It is
expected that the Company will take every reasonable action to equalize these problem areas to
comply with the Overtime Agreement. It is also
expected that the Company will utilize different

-4people on the next problem assignment and
notify the Union in wiring whenever this
cannot be done and state the reason(s) why.
Then, if at the end of the nine months, the
inequality has not been fully corrected, the
Local Union involved will have to determine
if the Company has made a good-faith effort
to equalize overtime."
On September 22, 1977, H.F. Foley, Director of Operations
and Control, responded on behalf of the Company to Mr. DeGregory's
letter.

Mr. Foley's letter (hereinafter the "Foley

letter")

states in pertinent part:
"As I see it, we are in basic agreement, but
there are a couple of problem areas typical
of those that need clarification so that there
will be no misunderstanding between the Parties,
including any of the Local Union Chief Stewards,
as to what constitutes a good faith effort on the
part of the Employer when certain problem areas
cannot be equalized. It has been my understanding,
and I am sure you will agree with me, that when
the Company has taken reasonable steps to distribute overtime equally, or causes beyond our control
make it not feasible to do so, then whatever overtime hours have accumulated outside of the sixteen
hour tolerance shall not be considered as a
liability for the Company to pay.
Essentially, there are two types of overtime work
assignments which temporarily result in an abnormal buildup of overtime premium hours; they
are special work assignments requiring a particular expertise (such as Probolog) and foreign
work assignment (i.e., Spain, Scotland, etc.).
I want to explain these situations so you will
know what is involved and how we intend to handle
it. That way, it will be easy to determine
whether or not we have acted in good faith.
We recently had approximately fifty of your
members perform a Probolog on SSN650, where
they accumulated substantial overtime. Because
of the necessity to extensively train employees
to do Probolog work, it would not be feasible
for the Company to continuously train while this
job is in process and thereby allow equalization.
However, even though Probolog assignments are
affected by an employe's capabilities, as new
Probologs are scheduled, we will expand the

-5number of employes by training additional
people to allow for greater capability and
permit overtime equalization. The amount
of time involved in training employes to the
high degree required varies from trade to
trade, but I believe a good estimate would be
approximately thirty hours per employe. It
varies because some trades require more training than others.
* •• •

I trust you are in agreement with the foregoing.
I would appreciate your signing the original of
this letter and return the same to me. Likewise,
I will sign your letter of April 1, 1977, and
return the original to you. That will consummate
our understanding of the intent and application
of the Memorandum of Understanding dated January
28, 1977."
Both letters were so counter-signed.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On November 21, 1977, the then Chief Steward of the Union,
Mr. Armand Levasseur, cited the Company for inequality in the
distribution of overtime for warehousement in the first shift.

1

The citation was based upon the MTC Overtime Report ("tab run"),
dated November 12, 1977, which had been issued to the Union as
required by the Agreement.

That tab run showed a variation in

relevant overtime premium hours credited from a low of 48.5 hours
2
for John J. Vasquez to a high of 164.575 for Michael E. Roberts.
1. Other shifts which were also cited are not relevant to this
arbitration.
2. The tab run shows that Edward J. Kelley had only 26 overtime
hours and that Jack D. Hostetler had only 30.875 hours. However, Mr. Levasseur testified that in citing the Company for
inequality he didn't "consider" either Mr. Kelley or Mr.
Hostetler, since he knew they were both on light duty because
of medical reasons. Therefore pursuant to Article X, §6(b)(l),
they were exempt from the equalization requirements at issue
in this proceeding.
3. The tab runs! show that Silas M. Davis had 208.625 hours and
that Norman W. Belleville had 122.250 hours. However, Mr.
Levasseur testified that these individuals had accumulated their
overtime in Spain. Thus, these employees were exempt from the
equalization requirements pursuant to the DeGregory/Foley letters
The gap between Mr. Roberts' overtime hours and the next highest relevant employee, William R. Warner, was 64.5 hours.

-6Thereafter, the Company conducted an internal investigation of the inequality and concluded that, in its opinion,
the first shift warehousemen were not required to be equalized
with Mr. Roberts because they were not capable of performing
his functions within the meaning of Article X, Section
of the Agreement.

6B(2)

The evidence indicates that the Company did

not notify the Union of its conclusion until more than nine
months after the citation of inequality.

The Company did under-

take to equalize all other warehousement among each other.

Thus,

by the end of the six month period following the citation of
inequality, the variation between the highest and lowest overtime hours was reduced to about 26 hours.

However, the tab run

of May 27, 1978, shows that Mr. Roberts received an additional
46.5 hours of overtime bringing his total to 211.325 overtime
hours.
Based upon the tab run of May 27, 1978, the Union filed
this grievance on June 1, 1978 on behalf of 123 warehousemen ,
hereinafter referred to as the grievants.

By the end of the

4
ninety-day post grievance period, the variation among almost all
of the grievants on the first shift, other than Roberts, was
within the 16 hour variation permitted by the Agreement.

Although

Roberts had received no additional overtime since the filing of
the grievance, his total overtime hours was 79.575 hours greater
than that of the warehousemen with the next highest total.
4. The Company contends that two employees, J. Davis and W. Bliven,
are not includable in the relevant equalization group because the
were on light duty assignment as of August 12, 1978. The Union
has not accepted the Company's position. Neither party introduced
sufficient evidence tending to show whether these employees were
medically restricted. If they were included in the equalization

-7THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
The Union
The Union contends that all non-medically restricted
warehousemen on the First Shift should have been equalized to
within 16 hours of Michael Roberts at the end of the nine-month
period.

Since the Company failed to do so and since the varia-

tion between Roberts and the others is in excess of 50 hours,
the Agreement mandates that the Company pay to each of the
grievants listed in Union Exhibit 2 the differences between
their overtime and that of Roberts, less sixteen hours.

The

total dollar amount claimed by the Union is approximately
$193,000.
The Union rejects any contention that Roberts performed
a function which the other warehousement were incapable of
performing.

Indeed, the Union argues that the Company cannot

group, then the variation between them and some other warehousemen would be in excess of 16 hours.
It should also be noted that the tab run of August 12, 1978 attributes more overtime hours to about forty employees than does
the Union's calculations in Union Exhibit #2. However, the
August 12th tab run is a joint exhibit, as well as a normal business record, and the Union has offered no evidence to support
any contention tending to disprove the printed overtime hours on
the August 12th tab run, other than its own conclusionary
calculations. Thus, I accept the accuracy of the printed hours
on the tab run.
Finally, the tab run reflects handwritten increases over the
printed overtime hours for several employees. Without these
adjustments, one employee, Mr. Christie, would have 20.325 less
overtime hours than the highest overtime employee other than
Roberts. However, the Company introduced uncontraducted evidence
showing that these manual adjustments are made in the ordinary
course of business and are necessary to account for overtime work
which is performed on Sundays and are thus not reflected in the
computer printout for that work week. Since the Union introduced
no evidence tending to show that any particular adjustment was
incorrect, I accept their accuracy.

-8claim that Mr. Roberts was performing special functions because
of the Company's failure to enter into a specific agreement with
the Union to exempt Roberts from the equalization process.

The

Union points to at least one prior situation where such an agreement was made.
In any event, the Union contends that a warehouseman with
spare parts experience could perform Mr. Roberts' functions and
that any warehouseman with one hour's training could so perform.
The grievants could resolve any difficulty in locating a specific
locker by making inquiry to tradesmen. Navy personnel or the
Spare Parts Coordinator.

To buttress its contention, the Union

makes the following arguments: (1) there were a number of
grievants who had spare parts experience at Mystic; (2) many
grievants participated in spare parts loading on the 688 submarine; (3) when Roberts was absent, his replacement had no
special training or experience; and (4) after the filing of the
Union's grievance, others performed Roberts' functions on overtime without any special training.
The Union relies on a prior decision by Arbitrator Stockman
which it claims establishes that the Company cannot in effect
create for equalization purposes sub-classes of warehousemen by
requiring that "in order for a person to be capable of performing
a given overtime job, he must meet every bona fide requirement
that pertains to the performance of the job."

The Union claims

the Stockman decision also establishes that the Company cannot
avoid equalization by refusing to train employees solely for the
purpose of equalizating overtime.

It notes that Arbitrator

Stockman held that the Company could not deprive otherwise
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qualified warehousement of overtime because of reluctance, on
grounds of productivity, to break up crews which were familiar
with the work.

The Union argues that the Stockman decision still

stands, even though the Company's federal court action to overturn that decision resulted in a settlement agreement between
the parties.
Lastly, the Union rejects the contention that pursuant to
the DeGregory/Foley letters, the Company should be absolved of
any monetary liability in this case because of its "good faith"
in concluding that Roberts performed unique functions.

The Union

argues that the Company did not act in good faity because (1)
the Company did not notify the Union in writing or otherwise as
to why the inequality could not be avoided; (2) the Company
distributed additional overtime to Roberts after the citation of
inequality; (3) no special training was required to perform
Roberts' functions, and (4) the Company did not train any other
warehousemen to do the job.

In any event, the Union claims that

the DeGregory/Foley letters provide that the Union must determine
whether the Company has acted in "good faith."

Since the Union

has determined that the Company did not act in good faith in this
case, the DeGregory/Foley letters cease to have any effect, and
the express language of the 1975-79 Agreement and Memoranda apply
in full.

The Union rejects another decision by Arbitrator Holden

in which he stated that the Company's "good faith" would relieve
it of any monetary obligation and that, in no event, could the
Company be liable for failure to equalize when there was not a
sufficient amount of overtime available within the nine month
period to do so.

-10With respect to the remedy, if this Arbitrator does not accept
the Union's calculation of damages in Union Exhibit 2, the Union
proposes further proceedings to resolve any open questions.
The Company
The Company contends that Roberts cannot properly be included in any calculation of overtime inequality because he performed functions of which he alone was capable.

Thus, pursuant

to Section 6B(2) of the Agreement, his overtime comes within the
exception to the equalization requirements.

Without Roberts in

the calculation, the Company contends that no showing of overtime
inequality is possible. With regard to Roberts' capabilities,
the Company notes that he was the only first-shift warehouseman
who had and was required to have knowledge of the precise locatio
and pre-designated contents of each of the approximately 800
lockers aboard the 688 class submarine.

The Company claims that

Roberts had acquired such expertise because of extensive on-thejob training.

The Company notes that Roberts is the only full-

time spare parts warehouseman on the first-shift and the only one
that is needed.

Roberts was expected to load the 688 submarine

without direction as to location of lockers and to supervise othe
warehousemen in major loadings.
warehousemen

The Company contends that other

who lacked Roberts' on-the-job training would re-

quire ten weeks of formal training to acquire Roberts' expertise
and to train other employees just for the purpose of equalizing
overtime would be contrary to the purpose underlying Section 6B(2
of the Agreement.

Although the Company contends that the Stockma

decision is of no force or effect because of the settlement agree
ment which resulted from its court challenge, it argues that

-11Arbitrator Stockman's reasoning supports their position in this
regard.

The Company contends that when Roberts was absent, his

replacements did not engage in any major parts loading and thus
did not perform his functions.
The Company rejects the Union's argument that there must
be a written agreement to exempt Roberts from the overtime
equalization provision.

It argues that the one prior agreement

is not sufficient evidence of past practise to modify the clear
language of Article X, Sevtion 6B(2) which makes no reference
to any such requirement.
The Company also argues, that even if this Arbitrator
concludes that Roberts did not perform functions for which he
was uniquely qualified, the Company should not be liable for
damages because it had acted in good faith within the framework
of the DeGregory/Foley letters.

In this regard, the Company also

relies on Arbitrator Holden's decision as establishing a good
faith standard in order to prevent the remedial provisions of
the Agreement from operating as an arbitrary and inequitable
penalty.

The Company contends that it exercised good faith in

its classification of Roberts for two reasons.

First, in

assigning Roberts overtime, the Company relied on its belief
that prior to the citation of inequality there was an oral agreement between the Company and the Union to exempt the spare parts
loader from the equalization requirements.

Second, upon receipt

of the citation, the Company undertook a thorough and
considered investigation of Roberts' functions, the result of
which strongly indicated that Roberts was uniquely qualified to
perform the spare parts function.

With respect to its good faith
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the Company also notes its successful efforts to equalize almost
all of the warehousemen, other than Roberts.

The Company

buttresses its claim that it acted in good faith by noting the
Union's failure to communicate its position as to which employees
were required to have their overtime equalized and which employees came within an exception to the overtime provisions.
Further, the Company contends that since the Union was
aware of the disparity involving Roberts for some time prior to
November, 1977, the Union had an obligation to object to any
overtime inequality before it filed its November 21st citation.
The Union's failure to do so permitted the Company to reasonably
conclude that the Union agreed that Roberts did not come within
the overtime equalization provisions.

Indeed, the Company argues

that the Union should be estopped from now claiming that the
failure to equalize Roberts' overtime constitutes a violation
of the Agreement.

The Company contends that by the time the

Union cited the inequality, the Company did not have enough
overtime to equalize, even had they wanted to do so.

Thus, the

Union must "share a large part of the responsibility for (the
failure to equalize)."
Lastly, the Company claims that a finding of monetary
liability in this case would expose the Company to an enormous
liability which would be punitive, rather than compensatory in
nature.

The Company in effect argues that the only real injury

suffered by the grievants in this case from the Company's allegec
violation of the Agreement, is that the net extra overtime hours
assigned! to Roberts were not equalized among the grievants.

Had

there been "equalization" and thus no breach, the result would

-13have been that only about 80 additional hours of overtime would
have been spread among the 123 grievants.

Yet, by reason of

the Union's construction of the remedial formula, the Union now
seeks a remedy which is more than one hundred times the actual
injury suffered by the grievants.
The Company argues that whether such a disproportionately
large penalty is ever justified, it is not justified in this
case, since the Company acted in good faith.

The Company contends

that the Union's position is contrary to the intent of the
parties and would destroy any workable system of overtime
distribution.
OPINION
In order to reach the issue of whether, within the meaning of Section 6B(2) the Agreement, the grievants were "not
capable of performing (the) particular functions within their
occupational title" which were performed on overtime by Michael
Roberts, two preliminary questions must be resolved.

First,

the Union contends that in order for an employee to come within
Section 6B(2), there must be a prior, specific agreement to that
effect between the Company and the Union.
agreement in this case.

There was no such

The Union has offered only one example

of such a prior agreement.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement

itself does not impose such a requirement and it is well-established that to modify the clear language of a written contract
past practice must constitute substantial evidence of a mutual
intent of both parties to alter or amend that contract.

One

example does not constitute a past practice or substantial evidence

-14of such a mutual intent.
regard is rejected.

Thus the Union's assertion in this

Nor do I find the Company's failure to

promptly notify the Union of the reasons for Roberts' inequality
in overtime bars the Company from asserting that Roberts is
exempt from the equalization requirements.

Although the

DeGregory letter states that the Company "should" and "is
expected" to so notify the Union, it does expressly state that
it must do so or be barred from asserting its defense to a
grievance.

On the other hand, the Company's failure so to

inform the Union until after the expiration of the nine month
equalization period is, in my opinion, not only neglectful but
prejudices the viability of an adequate framework for avoiding
disputes about overtime distribution.

However, I find that to

be a procedural problem, not a substantive defect fatal to the
Company's action.
Second, the Company contends that the Union is estopped
from asserting that Roberts' overtime does not come within the
contractual exception to equalization.

It argues that the Union

had notice prior to the November 12, 1977 tab run that Roberts
was receiving a large amount of overtime, but did not promptly
cite an inequality.

The Company asserts that had the Union done

so, the Company would have had more overtime available to
distribute to the grievants.
of merit for two reasons.

The Company's contention is devoid

First, a requirement of prompt

notice is not expressly imposed by the language of the agreement
Second, there is no evidence tending to show that the Company
would have equalized other warehousemen had the Union earlier
cited an inequality.

Indeed, the Company permitted Roberts to

-15work additional overtime even after the Union did cite the inequality.

In addition, the Company has asserted and continues

to assert that Roberts' overtime is not subject to the equalization requirements.
Thus, the issue narrows to the interpretation and
application of "not capable of performing" as that phrase is
used in Section 6B(2) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
If, as the Company contends, the grievants were not capable of
performing the work done by Roberts, this grievance must be
denied because the Company would not have breached the overtime
equalization provisions of the Agreement.

If the grievants were

capable of performing the work done by Roberts, then issues of
the Company's good faith and the punitive nature of the remedial
formula have to be resolved.
As a matter of interpretation, I find that the parties
intended that some employees within an occupational title may
not reasonably be expected to perform those functions which require special expertise acquired by extensive training whether
formal or on-the-job.

The Foley letter, to which the Union

agreed, expressly so stated.

Further, purely physical limita-

tions are in large measure separately dealt with in Section

B(l)

It should be noted that this arbitrator believes that if there
is a reasonable basis for the Company's conclusion that certain
functions should be performed on overtime, the Agreement does
not require that the Company do without those functions in order
to equalize

overtime among employees.

As applied to this case,

the issue is whether Roberts performed functions on overtime of
which only he was capable.

The issue is not whether the Company

-16should have incurred increased expense and less productivity
by eliminating the functions performed by Roberts when overtime
was available.

To interpret the Agreement differently would

be to unduly interfere with the Company's judgments concerning
efficiency and force the Company to vary its method of operation
between regular and overtime work.
intended such consequences.

I do not believe the parties

Thus, I turn to the application of

these principles to the instant case.
As the Union is the grieving party, it has the initial
burden of proving that there was a variation of more than 16
hours among employees on the same shift, in the same occupational
title.

If the Union satisfies that burden, the Company then

bears the burden of establishing the particular and unique
functions performed by the employee(s) with the high overtime.
It also has the burden of introducing evidence tending to
reasonably show that as a class, the grievants were not capable
of performing those functions.

However, if the Company satisfies

its initial burdens, the burden then shifts to the Union to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that each or any of
the grievants is or are capable of performing the functions in
issue.

As the Union seeks a monetary remedy which is punitive

in nature and impact, I am persuaded that the Union should bear
5
this latter burden of proof.

5. Although it is unnecessary to decide the legal status of the
Stockman arbitration, I note that this analysis is not inconsistant with that decision. In that case, the Company had introduced no evidence as to the nature of the work done on a number
of overtime assignments. Further, the Company introduced no
evidence tending to justify overtime assignments in the South
Yard. (See pages 37-38 of Union Exhibit #3). Lastly, the
Company did not initially introduce sufficient evidence tending
to show that the grievants were not capable of performing the
relevant overtime work.
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In this case, the tab runs satisfied the Union burden of
proving a variance of more than 16 hours among warehousemen
the first shift.

on

However, a careful and thorough review of the

evidence persuades me that the Company has satisfied its initial
burden of showing that Roberts performed unique and special
functions.

The Union did not by probative evidence satisfy its

burden of then showing to my satisfaction that any of the
individual grievants were capable of performing these functions.
Thus, it is unnecessary to resolve the parties' contention
concerning the Company's "good faith" or the punitive nature of
the monetary liability.
Leonard Golembeski, the Company's Spare Parts Coordinator
who was Roberts' supervisor, testified that Roberts was the only
warehouseman who worked regularly on the submarines and full tim
exclusively on spare parts.

He further testified that Roberts

knew, and was required to know, the precise location by number
of each of the more than 800 lockers on the class 688 submarine.
This was so because Roberts had the responsibilities of undertaking major spare parts stowage in those lockers without direct
supervision by Mr. Golembeski and of directing to those lockers
other warehousemen who were needed to physically assist in those
major loadings.

Mr. Golembeski testified that because of the

unusual location of many lockers, a warehouseman who did not
know what Roberts knew would not be capable of locating particular lockers without direction by Roberts or a Company supervisor
or tradesmen or Navy personnel.

He also stated that even if

Navy personnel were available to direct warehousemen to lockers,
many of the Navy people were themselves unfamiliar with locations

-18of specific lockers.

My own on site inspection confirms the

unusual location of a significant number of lockers.

Mr.

Golembeski testified that Roberts had accumulated his overtime
almost exclusively on major spare parts loading while performing these functions.
warehousemen

Mr. Golembeski further testified that

who had previously worked on spare parts at Mystic

and loaded submarines other than the 688 would not be able to
perform Roberts' functions since that prior experience would
not enable them to know the precise location of each locker on
the 688.

Mr. Roberts had gained his expertise by extensive

experience on the 688 submarine.

Mr. Golembeski stated that

it would take three to five months for a person to learn the
location of the lockers.

He also testified that there were no

plans, maps or lists available which would enable a warehouseman
without Roberts' expertise to perform his functions.
In short, this witness's testimony establishes that
Roberts was required to perform the functions of locating each
locker without assistance and to direct others to those lockers;
that performance of these functions accounted for almost all of
his overtime work; and that at all relevant times no other warehouseman was capable of performing those functions since they
lacked the requisite knowledge gained by experience and training.

This testimony clearly satisfied the Company's initial

burden of introducing evidence tending to reasonably show that
as a class, the grievants were not capable of performing
6
functions.

Roberts

6. This conclusion distinguishes the one specific situation
involved in the Stockman arbitration. In that case, the Company
introduced insufficient evidence to establish that any member of
the regular crew who was given overtime preference had any unique
expertise gained by extensive training. Thus, Arbitrator Stockman
concluded that other warehousemen were capable of performing the
same functions.

-19The Union's evidence failed to show that each or any of
the grievants were capable of performing those functions.
only grievant who testified was William R. Warner.

The

Although he

testified that a warehouseman with prior experience in spare
parts could perform Roberts' functions and that any warehouseman
could learn those functions in one hour, he admitted on crossexamination that he did not know that Roberts was required to
know the exact location of each locker.

Indeed, he testified

that he had seen Roberts going with other warehousemen to show
them the location of a particular locker and that he believed
that was done on a pre-arranged basis.

Mr. Warner admitted that

if Roberts was required to know the exact location of each
locker, it would not take only an hour of preparation to perform
his functions.

At one point in his testimony, Mr. Warner stated

that he had experienced difficulty finding a particular locker
on the 688 submarine and resolved it by asking others to assist
him.
In short, Mr. Warner's own testimony indicates that he
as well as other warehousemen

did not know the exact location

of all the lockers on the 688 and that direction by others who
did know was required to locate some lockers on the ship.

The

fact that Mr. Warner did not believe that Roberts should have
been required to know the locations or to function as a "quasi"
working leader, does not demonstrate that Roberts was not in
fact performing those functions and that the other warehousemen
were capable of performing them.

Thus, Mr. Warner's testimony

does not contradict the Company's position, much less satisfy
the Union's burden of proof.

-20Nor does any other evidence satisfy that burden.

Although

Mr. St. Armour replaced Mr. Roberts when he as was absent, Mr.
Golembeski testified that Mr. St. Armour did not stow any material
in the 688 nor did he supervise any other person who stowed because there were no major spare parts loadings while Roberts was
absent.

Further, although Donald Wilson and some other warehouse-

men were used "in place" of Mr. Roberts after the filing of the
Union's grievance, there is no evidence tending to show that Mr.
Wilson was capable of performing Mr. Roberts' functions at that
t ime.

In fact, Mr. Golembeski testified that as of July, 1979,

Mr. Wilson had only about "fifty per cent of Mr. Roberts' function'
and that he had given Wilson about two months of part-time training.

Lastly, the mere fact that other warehousemen worked on an

overtime basis on 688 spare parts loading does not establish that
they performed Roberts' functions or were capable of performing
those functions.
This is not to say that warehousemen other than Roberts
could not become capable of performing these functions if the
Company provided adequate training.

Indeed, the Company at least

implicitly concedes that they could so perform with such training
although it introduced evidence showing that such training would
take three to five months on job or ten weeks in a more formal,
intensive setting.

However, the Article X, Section 6B(2) refers

to employees "who are not capable" (emphasis added) and not to
employees who cannot be made capable.

It means, to my mind, that

an employee must be presently capable, not potentially capable
if trained, in order to participate in the work. Arbitrator
Stockman noted that during negotiations proceeding the prior
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Collective Bargaining Agreement, "the Company made it quite
apparent that it was not going to train employees solely for
the purpose of equalizing overtime," Thus, he stated that "it is
to be doubted, therefore, that such a requirement can be imposed
on the Company."

He further stated:

"It may well be that where a particular
function is performed only infrequently,
the need is only for the availability of
a limited number of employees capable of
performing that function. It would obviously be pointless, as well as grossly
inefficient, to train hundreds of employees
for the sporadic and infrequent occasions
when work of that nature might be required
just for the purpose of equalizing overtime.
And it is to be doubted that the parties
intended the provision to be applied in
that manner."
Although Arbitrator Stockman focuses on the "infrequency" of the
performance of certain functions, I find his reasoning persuasive
in a situation such as the instant case wherein Mr. Roberts is
the only warehouseman whose normal and required functions necessitated knowledge of the precise locations of the lockers on the
688.

I do not believe that the parties intended to apply the

overtime provisions so as to impose a punitive monetary liability
on the Company because of its failure to undertake extensive
training of over one hundred employees between November 21, 1977
and August 12, 1978.
Nor does the Foley letter point to a different conclusion.
He therein states: "Because of the necessity to extensively train
employees to do Probolog work, it would not be feasible for the
Company to continuously train while this job is in progress and
thereby allow equalization."

Although he does indicate that the

Company would expand the number of employees who would be capable
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of performing specific functions by providing additional trainings
he does not promise to train all members of an occupational class
nor to train any particular number of them within the nine-month
equalization period.
I agree with Arbitrator Stockman's conclusion that exceptions cannot outweigh the basic commitment to divide overtime work
equally among employees within an occupational title.

If I had

concluded that only minimal training were needed to make other
warehousemen capable of performing Roberts' functions, I might
well have found a violation of the Agreement.

However, based on

the evidence, I do not find that to be the case here.

On the

other hand, in the Foley letter the Company has assumed the
obligation to act in good faith and committed itself to provide
additional training on a flexible basis to expand overtime opportunities.

And in this case, in reaction to the filing of the

grievance, the Company has undertaken to train one other warehouseman.

If in the future, the Company provides no additional

training to a reasonable number of willing and able warehousemen,
it would, in my opinion, assume a substantial risk of violating
its obligations with respect to overtime equalization.
Thus, I conclude that the overtime hours credited to
Michael Roberts during the period relevant to this grievance are
excluded from the equalization requirement.

As noted previously,

all but two of the other grievants are within the permissable
sixteen hour variation among each other and hence, are not entitled
to any relief under the Agreement.

These two, J. Davis and W.

Bliven may be entitled to a remedy, if they were not on light
duty assignments during the relevant period.

Neither the Company

-23or the Union has offered sufficient evidence to permit me to
make any findings on the status of these two grievants.

Accord-

ingly, and consistent with the Union's position on light duty
assignments, I direct that the parties attempt to resolve their
differences with respect to these grievants.

If they cannot,

either may initiate further proceedings before me or under the
contract on these questions.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance is denied. The Company did
not violate the overtime equalization provisions of the contract in connection with
the assignment of overtime work for warehousemen on the first shift. The status
of J. Davis and W. Bliven is reserved pursuant to the foregoing Opinion.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 25, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, Local
1302-, -AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Gr. C-6-82

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was the three day suspension of Arthur
Miller for just cause? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on June 8, 1982
at which time Mr. Miller, hereinafter referred to as "the
grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic

record was taken and the Company filed a post-hearing brief.
The grievant was suspended three days for using profane
and disrespectful language, which in the opinion of the Company
was directed to or was disparagingly about Foreman Bruce Hart,
and for persisting thereafter in refusing to give Hart his labor
time card when Hart demanded it.
This is a disciplinary case with the burden on the Company
to prove all elements of the offense charged.

The Company has

proved to my satisfaction that the grievant improperly refused
to give the foreman his time card when ordered to do so.

However

the Company has not clearly and convincingly shown that the

-2profane statement made by the grievant, albeit in the foreman's
presence and within his hearing, was directed to the foreman
or even related to anything the foreman was then doing.
The grievant admits that he made the remark "management
is all fucked up" and that it "would have to eat its words."
Though such language is unsocial in other settings, it is
common in a shipyard.

Though it was said in close proximity

to the foreman it has not been shown that it related to the
foreman's check of employee time cards to see if they had left
their work places early, nor has it been shown that it related
to Foreman Hart in any respect.

The Company draws the inference

that the remark was so related, but in disciplinary cases

an

inference is not sufficient to establish either intent or guilt.
Indeed the statement, particularly the last part thereof, namely
that management

"would have to eat its words" does not bear

logical relevance to the foreman's check of time cards.

It

could just as logically and easily relate to something else that
management generally had done about which the grievant was
complaining to his fellow employees.
Again, though language or comments of this type are hardly
commendable, I am not prepared to hold that an obscene expression
of dissatisfaction with management which otherwise is not insubordinate or challenging to management's authority or to a
particular managerial employee(s), is a disciplinary offense.
It is well recognized that employees complain about their
superiors and about the organization for which they work, and
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in a shipyard and other industrial setting they often do so with
off-color or profane phrases.

Based on the record before me I

am not prepared to conclude that the circumstances were any
different in the instant case.
However, it does not matter why the foreman demanded the
grievant's time card.
give it to him.

The grievant had no right to refuse to

Indeed, even if the foreman's demand for the

time card was based on a misunderstanding

of the grievant's

statement, or even if, as the grievant claims, the foreman
verbally abused him with a racial slur, the demand for the time
card should have been complied with.

Any improper action by the

foreman should then have been the subject of a grievance.
Because I think that the three day suspension was significantly based on the grievant's remark about management which the
Company interpreted to have been directed to or concerning the
actions of the foreman, and because that element of the allegation has not been proved by the quantum of proof required in
disciplinary cases, I shall reverse the disciplinary suspension.
In its place, and for the grievant's wrongful refusal to give
the foreman his time card when ordered to do so, the grievant
shall be reprimanded.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The three day suspension of Arthur Miller
was not for just cause. It is reduced to
a reprimand. He shall be made whole for
the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 21, 1982
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York ) " '"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
Communication Workers of America

and
AWARD

and
New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article 9 and/or
Section 8.05 of the collective bargaining
agreement by failing to give "temporary
increase" pay treatment as a supplies coordinator to garage attendant Michael
Breslin from February 27 to May 23, 1978
and by failing to upgrade him permanently
to the supplies coordinator title?
Hearings were held on April 13 and July 15, 1981 at which
time Mr. Breslin, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named parties appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

I have concluded that the best evidence in this matter
are the grievant's time sheets for the critical period in question.

There is no dispute that "as a matter of record" and prior

to that disputed period, the grievant was removed from the temporary supplies coordinator title.

The narrow question is whether

subsequently, during that disputed period he continued to perform
supplies coordinator work to the extent and magnitude as would
entitle him to the temporary pay increase and to an upgrade to
the supplies coordinator title under the terms of the contract.

-2The grievant's time sheets filled out by the grievant himself, record his work assignments and duties as those in the
garage attendant classification and do not reflect activities as
a supplies coordinator.

I am not persuaded that those time sheet

are false, or that the grievant was instructed to fill them out
falsely or inaccurately.

Rather, I am satisfied that they reflec

the substantial bulk of the grievant's work during the disputed
period and accurately show that he had in fact been returned to
garage attendant duties.

It seems to me that if what he recorded

was substantially or substantively different from the work he
actually performed, he would and should have complained then and
would or should have grieved this matter a good deal earlier.

He

is now estopped from impeaching his own time sheets.
What happened I conclude, is that the major part of the
grievant's supplies coordinator work, namely, the administrative
and clerical work attendant to "prepping" new vehicles and "decommissioning" old vehicles, was either ended and removed from
the grievant's duties or dramatically reduced to a contractually
inconsequential amount.

Also, some of the paper work which the

grievant performed while T.I.'d and which understandingly he may
have thought was work within the supplies coordinator job, (but
which he failed to show on his time sheets), were duties also
within and assignable to a garage attendant, and hence properly
part of the grievant's work during the critical period.
I do find that on a de facto basis and from time to time
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during the critical period, one of the grievant's foreman did
direct him to perform some work identified with the supplies coordinator's classification; (i.e. the ordering of parts).
this regard the grievant was wrongly used.

In

However I cannot

find that those assignments were so substantial, continuous or
frequent as to meet the contractual test of a temporary assignment to the higher supplies coordinator job.
Finally, I conclude that with regard to certain other
paper work, including the keeping of a log, the grievant continued to do this on a gratuitous basis.

Or did so because of a

lack of knowledge of whether it was part of his duties as a
garage attendant or as a supplies coordinator.

However I do not

impute responsibility for that work to any supervisory employee.
In short, I hold that unquestionably the vast bulk of
supplies coordinator duties were removed from the grievant's work
assignments before the critical period; that if any arguable
supplies coordinator duties remained they were short-lived, or
overlapped with the duties of a garage attendant, were not of
sufficient quantity or duration or performed continuously to
meet the contract test for higher pay and classification; or were
performed by the grievant on his own and continued initiative
without supervisory direction or responsibility.
There is insufficient evidence to determine that the
grievant was removed from his T.I.'d status to avoid making him

-4eligible for a permanent upgrade.

Hence I need not deal with

the different views on that questions as expressed in prior
decisions by Arbitrators Glushien and Marlin.
For the forgoing reasons, the Undersigned duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article 9 and/or
Section 8.05 of the collective bargaining
agreement by failing to give "temporary increase" pay treatment as a supplies coordinator to garage attendant Michael Breslin from
February 27 to May 23, 1978 and by failing to
upgrade him permanently to the supplies coordinator title.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 20, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss<.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 20th day of January, 1982, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the forgoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15 30 0275 81
National Docket No.
67,601

and
General Electric Company
Syracuse, New York

The stipulated issue is:
Was the termination of Goldie Marcott on July
22, 1980 appropriate under the circumstances?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Liverpool, New York on October 28,
1981 at which time Ms. Marcott, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic

record was taken and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was terminated for excessive absenteeism under
the Company's "Area Policy On Absenteeism Due to Disability" on
a non-disciplinary

basis,.

The Company's right to administratively

terminate employees

for absenteeism, and not as a disciplinary offense, has been upheld by the arbitrators under the contract, including this
arbitrator, provided the Company adheres to its applicable Area
Policy and Application Guide. It applies when the reasons for the
unsatisfactory attendance record are beyond the employee's fault
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and control and do not involve misconduct.

The Company's view,

upheld by prior arbitration decisions, is that an employee whose
unsatisfactory attendance record is uncontrollable and beyond his
fault, albeit chronic, cannot be rehabilitated by discipline and
should not suffer the stigma of a disciplinary termination.
In the instant case the Union does not challenge the Company
right to terminate employees under the foregoing circumstance.
Rather, the Union's challenge to the Company's action is that it
was not in conformity with the Company's Area Policy and Application Guide.
The Company offered evidence to show that the grievant was
absent due to illness or disability 38 per cent of her total
available work days in 1973; 11 per cent in 1974; 31 per cent in
1975; 7 per cent in 1976; 14% per cent in 1977; 42 per cent in
1978; 12 per cent in 1979 and 66 per cent over the first 142
working days in 1980.

Based on Company records those absences

or a substantial part thereof were cumulatively due to a hernia
condition, neuritis with attendant dizziness, a nervous condition,
pernicious anemia, anxiety, a sinus condition, rheumatism, neuropathy, tonsilitis, asthma, scoliosis, a back and dorsal lumbar
strain and various infections.

Based on the analysis of the

Company's doctor together with medical reports from the grievant's
physician and her own reports of her absences, the Company concluded that the illnesses and disabilities were chronic within
the meaning of its Policy On Absenteeism Due to Disability,
warranting her termination on a non-disciplinary

basis.

-3The Union claims that the Company violated its Policy by charging
the grievant for absences which should have been excluded.

It

asserts she should not have been charged for illnesses for which
she received sick or personal leave pay, absences due to illnesses
or disabilities related to employment connected injuries, loss
of time directly from injuries on the job, scheduled Saturdays
(when it was the sixth working day of the week), and for any
illness or disability which independently was not "chronic."
Based on the Union's theory, the grievant?s absenteeism percentage would be markedly reduced, and, over some periods particularly during 1980 would be eliminated.
Additionally the Union argues that the Company neglected
to follow certain procedural steps of its Policy, particularly
with regard to the requirement that current medical information
be sought from the grievant's doctor and the convening of meetings
with the grievant relative to that medical information thereafter.
Also the Union claims that based on her seniority and the
provisions of the Policy the grievant had the right to be placed
on a different job, rather than terminated, when the working
conditions at her job place (ventilated cold air blowing on her)
aggravated her disabilities.resulting in further illnesses and
absences; but that the Company did not give her that transfer.
In short, the Union asserts that the grievant was improperl}
charged for a large number of her absences; that the Company
failed to comply with its Policy in the circumstances; that the
grievant's absences were not due to "chronic" conditions, and

-4hence her administrative

termination was unjustified.

In National Docket 55,627 dated December 31, 1980, I
stated:
"Whether; treated disciplinarily or as a
matter of managerial, authority it is
well settled generally as well as under
the collective bargaining relationship
between this Union and Company that employees with records of chronic absenteeism
: , regardless of reason or fault, and with no
reasonable prospect for improvement to a
satisfactory level of attendance may be
terminated or discharged. Universally
accepted is the principle that an employer,
to maintain production or services, is entitled to and may require a reliability of
attendance from its employees."
I find that statement applicable to the instant case.
The Union's contention that the grievant may not be held
responsible for absences for which she received sick pay or
personal day pay, is misplaced.
upon Policy 7-9.0.

The Union's position relies

That Policy applies to absenteeism for which

the employee is being disciplined.
that the grievant was terminated.
under Policy 8-1.0.

It is not under that Policy
Rather, she was dismissed

That latter Policy does not exclude from

consideration of an absentee record, absences for which sick pay
or personal leave was granted.

The pertinent part of Policy 8-1.

provides:
Generally, absences which are in fact due to
illness or disability are automatically considered to be "excused"- absences even though
they may be of relatively long duration. In
recognition of the fact that any employee may
at some time during his employment incur a
disability which forces his absence for an
extended period, the established Company

-5rules on continuity of service, and the
parallel provisions in Union agreements,
provide for protection of an employee's
service for a period of up to one year
during such an absence. However, these
provisions are concerned solely with the
determination of continuity of service and
service credits in relation to any one absence, and do noj: deal with the extent to
which chronic or repetitive absenteeism is
to be tolerated, (emphasis added)
The foregoing clearly means that absences due to illness
or disability, including those for which an employee receives
sick pay are and may be considered as part of "chronic or
repetitive absenteeism."
The Union's claim that many of the grievant's absences were
due to illnesses or disabilities causally related to an on-thejob injury is not supported by the evidence.

There is no proba-

tive medical evidence in the record showing the causal

connection

Though the grievant suffered an injury on the job in February of
1979, the Workmen's Compensation Report stated in pertinent part:
There is no remaining causally related disability. After a thorough review of the
file, the medical evidence does not indicate
any compensable lost time from work....
In the absence of other medical evidence or testimony, I
am unable to accept the grievant's allegations and the Union's
arguments that many of her absences were due to physical problems
including a back disability, which were related to that on-thejob injury.

Considering the Workmen's Compensation Board find-

ings, I must conclude that the burden of showing a further causal
relationship between that particular injury and subsequent illnesses and disabilities resulting in absences, must be borne by

-6the grievant.

That burden has not been met.

The Union's claim that the grievant should not be charged
for absences on scheduled Saturdays is not persuasive.

The reasor

the grievant did not work on Saturdays, when it was the sixth
working day in the week, was because her doctor restricted her to
a work week of forty hours.

That meant, in view of the Company's

contractual right to schedule a sixth working day, that she was
physically unable to work that prescribed assignment.

Perforce

therefore it was a day on which she was absent due to illness or
disability, and hence may properly be included as part of her
overall record of absenteeism.
The Union's interpretation of what constitutes "chronic"
absenteeism is not supported either by prior arbitration cases or
by the applicable Policy.

It is not required that each reason

for each absence be due to a chronic illness or disability. The
relevant part of Policy 8-1.0 reads:
The needs of the business make it wholly impractical to continue to carry indefinitely
individuals who, because of chronic or repeated
disability have demonstrated that they cannot
be depended upon to be anything more than parttime employees. This applies to individuals
whose continuing physical or mental conditions
results in repeated and relatively long-term
absences running into weeks or months, as well
as those who are frequently and repeatedly absent for one or more days at a time (emphasis added).
Clearly, based on the foregoing, chronic absenteeism may be
contractually defined as the totality of frequent and repeated
absences, and is not limited to separate reasons for each absence
which, standing alone must be medically chronic.

That is the

-7situation in this case.

Many of the grievant's medical difficulties

and disabilities are independently chronic.
to reoccur.

Others are not likel)

But what is "chronic" is the grievant's pattern of

repeated absences for various reasons, apparently uncontrolled
or uncontrollable, over an extended period of time.

The logical

conclusion drawn from that pattern is that there is no reasonable
basis to find that there would be any

difference or improvement

in her attendance record if her employment continued.
The definition of "chronic" is supported by the decision
of Arbitrator Yagoda in National Docket 55,699 dated May 21, 1980.
I agree with Mr. Yagoda's statement that:
"I find nothing in the procedural standards
enunciated by management for this type of
situation which conforms its application
only to absences caused by a single chronic
ailment. ...management has not proscribed
itself from applying it to situations in which
the frequent or extended absences are caused
by more than one disability."
Also instructive and determinative on this point is the
following provision in the Application Guide for Policy 8-1.0:
In applying the policy it is not intended that
any weight should be attached to an absence for
a reason such as surgery or disability due to
an accident, or even to an extended absence due
to illness where such absence is wholly unrelated
to other disability absences and there has been
full recovery with no reason to anticipate that
the employee will be subject to subsequent disabilities due to recurrences, or any related
conditions. Rather, this policy is intended to
apply to cases where over a period of time an
employee has had, and by virtue of his record
can be reasonable expected to continue to have,
an unacceptable record of attendance due to either
a chronic disability, some combination of disabilities or a general state of poor health,
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The latter sentence squares with the facts surrounding the grievant's record of absences.

If not wholly due to independent chroni

conditions, it is attributable to a combination of disabilities
and a general state of poor health.

There is insufficient evidenc

to bring her attendance record within the meaning of the first
sentence of the foregoing quotation.
With regard to the Union's claim that the grievant should
have been removed from the job at which cold air blew on her, and
placed on some other assignment, the Application Guide sets up
certain conditions.

First, it is to be determined that absences

can be attributed to the employee's "physical inability to cope
with the requirements or conditions involved in a certain job or
type of work."

And second it must be determined "whether a trans-

fer to some other type of work would eliminate the problem."

In

the instant case, though the grievant's doctor wrote that cold
air blowing on the grievant could aggravate her ailments and disabilities, I am not persuaded, as alleged, that her absences were
due to that working condition, nor, more significantly, considering
the grievant's long history of absenteeism for many different
medical conditions, am I persuaded,that a transfer to some other
type of work would significantly improve her attendance.

So, I

find neither an absolute right to the transfer claimed by the Unior
nor

enough evidence to meet the conditions upon which any such

transfer would be appropriately based.
Finally, if the Company did not precisely follow each
procedural step and sequence of the applicable Policy and Guide
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(for example a review by the foreman of the employee's status
with the Company's physician and the scheduling of periodic
discussions with the grievant) I do not find those limited
procedural defects to be fatal in this case.

The fact is that

representatives of the Company talked repeatedly with the grievant over the years and contemporaneously about her poor attendance record.

Her medical condition and medical reports from her

physician as well as from the Company doctor were regularly and
fully considered.

The alleged procedural defects, if any, were

minimal and not prejudicial.
Considering all the foregoing, the Company has established
that the grievant"s record of absenteeism over a requisite period
of time was extensive and excessive.

Though apparently beyond

her fault and control, it was "chronic" within the meaning and
conditions of Policy 8-1.0, justifying the grievant's nondisciplinary termination.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Goldie Marcott on July
22, 1980 was appropriate under the circumstances .

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

February 21, 1982

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 761, I.U.E.

AWARD AND OPINION
Case #5230 0473-81
ND #69,590

and
General Electric Company
Louisville, Kentucky

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of T. J. Mattingly
on April 20, 1981 was for just cause. If
not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on December 18,
1981 at which time Mr. Mattingly, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic

record was taken; and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged under the Company's cumulative
and progressive discipline policy for a second violation of the
same work rule within a twelve month period.

That policy is not

challenged herein by the Union.
The grievant is charged with leaving his work place and the
plant without permission for approximately three hours on April
15-16, 1981.
Assuming arguendo the accuracy of the facts as alleged by
the grievant, I cannot find that he was or even had reasonable

-2reason to believe that he was on an authorized half-day vacation
during his scheduled shift on April 15-16, 1981, when the Company
claims he was away from his job and work station without permission.
The grievant asserts that he told his foreman that he "was
taking a half-day vaction" (i.e. the last four hours of the
shift).

He does not claim that the foreman responded approvingly.

Indeed, under the grievant's version of what happened, the foreman didn't respond one way or the other.
Under that circumstance, and particularly

in light of the

grievant's undisputed poor prior record, including an earlier
offense of leaving his job without permission, I fail to see how
he could have concluded or had the right to conclude that his
claimed half-day vacation was approved or authorized.

For approval

or authorization there must be some form of bilateral communication
and agreement.

The employee asks for or gives notice of a half-

day off and by word,' conduct or act, the foreman approves, authorizes, or at least notes it in some affirmative way.

No such

responses by the foreman are alleged by the grievant, and therefore the grievant had no right to leave.
Any method which accords a half-day vacation toaan employee
solely on the employee's statement, unless expressly practiced
or contractually founded,, .would be manifestly ^.edraptltve '"

•"<-

to an employers ability to plan and schedule the work day, and is
inconsistent with the well recognized right of management to
schedule and manage the work force.

Vacation time is an employee

-3benefit and right.

But the Company has the right to adequate

notice-j(6f its use.

In such a short-notice situation as is in-

volved here, the Company obviously may require its approval or
authorization of the time off before the employee may utilize
the half-day vacation benefit.
I conclude the grievant should have known that approval or
affirmative acknowledgement by his foreman was needed.

He had had

prior disciplinary difficulties including a specific incident of
a similar type within the prior one year period, for which he was
suspended.

He acknowledged that he knew of the Company's policy

to impose the penalty of discharge for the second occurance of
the same offense within a one year period.

He had the duty to be

certain that his foreman approved or gave permission for the halfday vacation, and was on notice that a bare statement to the
effect that he'd be taking a half-day vacation was not enough to
allow it.

I must conclude that at best he followed a cavalier

course, when he had an obligation to be more prudent and certain.
Considering his prior disciplinaryirecord, his knowledge
of the Company's uncontested cumulative disciplinary policy and
the mandate of that policy that discharge may be imposed for the
second, same rule violation within a twelve month period, I cannot
fault the Company's decision.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The discharge of T. J. Mattingly on April
20, 1981 was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March 8, 1981
STATE OF New York )oco
.
o• •
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #54 30 2134 81
N.D. 68,710

IUE, Local 931
and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discipline imposed on the employees set forth in Joint
Exhibit No. 1 for their conduct on January
8, 1981, which the Company alleges was in
violation of Article XIV Section 1 of the
Agreement? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 2, 1982 in Holland, Michigan
at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The Company charges that the' affected employees engaged in
an illegal work stoppage on January 8, 1981, in violation of
Article XIV of the contract.

It asserts that the varied disciplin

imposed was properly related to the nature and extent of each
employee's involvement in that work stoppage.
Though the Company put forward an affirmative case in
support of the foregoing allegations and the propriety of the
discipline imposed, the Union presented no direct or affirmative
case in defense.

Instead it limited its case to its cross-exam-

ination of Company witnesses and to 'argument in its brief.
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I find that the limited extent of the Union's case has
failed to rebut the Company's prima facie case with regard to
the work stoppage and the involvement therein of the affected
employees.

Hence I conclude that a work stoppage took place on

January 8, 1981; that the affected employees participated or
were otherwise involved in that stoppage and that the differing
penalties imposed not only related to the respective

involvement

of each affected employee but were disciplinarily proper,
provided the strike violated Article XIV of the contract.
Based on the evidence before me, the only justiciable
issue is whether the work stoppage was lawful or unlawful.

It

it to this question that the Union directs its major attention.
It is the Union's claim that the work stoppage was
authorized by the Union within the special provisions of Article
XIV which make a strike permissible.

Article XIV reads:

Strikes and Lockouts
1. There shall be no strike, sitdown, slowdown, employee demonstration or any other organized or concerted interference with work
of any kind in connection with any matter subject to the grievance procedure, and no such
interference with work shall be directly or
indirectly authorized or sanctioned by a Local
or the Union, or their respective Officers or
Stewards, unless and until all of the respective
provisions of the successive steps of the grievance
procedure set forth in Article XIII shall have
been complied with by the Local and the Union.
The foregoing exception will not apply if (a)
the matter is submitted to arbitration as provided in Article XV, or (b) 12 months shall have
elapsed after receipt by the Union of the Company's
final decision on the grievance at Step Three,
or (c) the Company shall not have received written
or telegraphic notice of such strike from the Local
more than 24 hours prior to the commencement of
such strike, which notice will specify the exhausted

-3grievance over which the strike is being
called. Upon receipt by the Company of
such a strike notice, the Company and
the Union will meet immediately to discuss
the dispute and the contemplated action
so that management may assess the situation.
It is the Union's position that the work stoppage was
permitted under Article XIV because "all of the respective provisidns
of the successive steps of the grievance procedure set forth in
Article XIII (were) complied with by the Local and the Union";
that "the Company (received) written...notice of such strike from
the Local more than 24 hours prior to the commencement of such
strike;11 and that the Local or the'Union expressly informed the
Company that the stoppage was authorized or sanctioned by the
Union in view of and under the foregoing circumstances.
The evidence does not support these contentions.

The Union

did not indicate definitively in the course of the arbitration
what dispute or what grievance(s) prompted the work stoppage.
Instead it was left to the testimony of Company witnesses to
speculate that the stoppage took place because of disagreements
over the 1981 vacation shutdown.

This speculation was not denied

by the Union.
Also unrefuted is the Company's testimony that though the
parties were in disagreement over the 1981 vacation schedule, the
Union had not filed any grievance on that question by the time of
the January 8 work stoppage.

It is apparent therefore that if the

stoppage related to or was an outgrowth of that dispute, the
successive steps of the grievance procedure had not been invoked

-4let alone complied with.

In that 'circumstance a work stoppage

would have been premature and hence illegal.
The Union states that it had reserved its right to strike
when prior to January 8th, it notified the Company in writing
that with regard to some other fourteen pending grievances which
apparently had cleared all steps of the grievance procedure, it
reserved its right to strike.

In two respects this "reservation"

did not create an authorized or lawful strike on January 8th.
First, the Union did not identify the nature of any of those 14
grievances, nor was there testimony by representatives of the
Union or employees that the work stoppage on January 8th was due
to any of those disputes. And secondly, under Article XIV one
of the conditions which would prohibit a strike over a grievance(s)
which had completed all of the grievance steps is if the Company
had "not received written or telegraphic notice of such strike
from the Local more than 24 hours prior to the commencement of
such strike, which notice will specify the exhausted grievance over
which the strike is being called."

I am not persuaded that a

notice that the Union "reserved" the right to strike constitutes
prior notice of the "commencement" of a strike, assuming arguendo
that the instant work stoppage resulted from one or more of those
14 grievances on which the right was reserved. A reservation of
a right does not mean and is not yet notice that the right will be
exercised.

Once the Union decided to strike, the Company was

entitled to more than 24 hours notice of that action.

It is the

notice prior to the planned commencement of the strike which the
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Union did not give in this case.
The undisputed evidence shows that the strike began before
the Union gave notice to the Company that the Union was authorizing it.

That the Company refused to accept a proffered

grievance by the Union after the strike began does not cure the
Union's failure or absolve the Union from its contractual obligation to give more than 24 hours notice before the commencement of
any strike.

Indeed the notice requirement, as the contract states

is to afford the parties an opportunity to discuss the dispute
before any contemplated strike begins.

In the instant case not

only was the notice not timely given by the Union, but the express
contractual purpose for that notice was frustrated by the earlier
commencement of the work stoppage. Therefore, in those respects
the work stoppage of January 8th could not be authorized or
legalized by the after-the-fact attempt by the Union to cloak it
with legitimacy.
The foregoing is supported by the testimony.

Company

witness Wassink testified that after the stoppage began the Union
business agent Kellum said that the picket line was not authorized
or sanctioned and that the Union "did not know they were going to
do this and we spent all morning trying to prevent this and we
thought it was taken care of."

Kellum also said to Wassink a

short time later:
"in order to protect some innocent people
out on that picket line I am going to
have to give you a docket number to make
this a legal strike."
The Union offered no testimony to deny those statements by the

-6Union business agent.
It is clear that the commencement of the work stoppage and
the establishment of the picket line was a surprise to the Union;
that the Union had not authorized its commencement, and that only
belatedly, in the mistaken believe that it could be "legalized"
if a grievance or docket number was handed in to the Company, did
the Union attempt to immunize the.affected employees from their
violation of the no strike provision of the contract.

Indeed had

the "reservation" of the right to strike over the previously
referred to fourteen grievances been adequate contractual notice
to authorize the stoppage, the efforts by the Union to file a
grievance or a docket number after the picket line was set up,
would have been unnecessary.

That the Union made that effort is

again evidence that the strike was not over any of those grievance
that instead it resulted from some other dispute, probably the
1981 vacation schedule and that the reservation of the right to
strike is immaterial to this situation.
For all the reasons previously stated the Union's attempt
to provide such immunity failed because it did not follow or
comply with those express circumstances set forth in Article XIV
which would permit a strike.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
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There was just cause for the discipline imposed on the employees set forth in Joint
Exhibit No. 1 for their conduct on January
8, 1981.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 18, 1982
STATE OF New York )t
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument; which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
I.U.K.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52 30 0075 82
Gr. N.D. 72003

Local 761
and

General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of Gary Young on
September 28, 1981 was for just cause?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on March 30,
1982 at which time Mr. Young, hereinafter known as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A .stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The question is whether the Company has proved that the
grievant returned to the plant during his work shift possessing
anj intoxicant.

If so it would have been his second offense

involving an intoxicant within a twelve month period, and,
pursuant to well established Company rules and progressive
discipline, would have justified his discharge.
However I am not satisfied that the Company has proved the
charge clearly and convincingly.
The Company's case that the grievant possessed, and presumably was drinking alcohol mixed with a soft drink from a paper

-2cup, was based on a smell of the beverage first by a security
guard and later by a second security guard and a security
lieutenant.

They testified at the arbitration hearing that in

their opinion the beverage which the grievant had in his
possession contained alcohol mixed with a soft drink.

Under

the circumstances of this case, particularly because the burden
is on the Company to prove an allegation which would result in
the grievant's dismissal, clearly and convincingly, I do not
conclude this testimony and this•procedure to be sufficiently
probative to be conclusive or even persuasive.
Smelling the cup and the beverage is not a scientific
analysis.

If the Company seeks to safeguard against this type

of offense a better system should be employed.

No emergency or

extraordinary circumstances prevented the Company from using a
less questionable method of determining whether the beverage
contained alcohol.

The contents of the cup were not analyzed.

Neither the liquid nor the cup was retained for later analysis,
nor were they retained or introduced into evidence in this
arbitration.

The grievant was given no physical or chemical

test for drunkenness or for any level of intoxication.

Indeed

it is undisputed that he showed no signs of "being under the
influence."
Also, it is questionable in my mind whether the procedure
of having a second guard and a lieutenant later smell the
beverage to confirm the first guard's suspicions is sufficiently
valid to be credited in such a discipline case.

No doubt the

-3second guard and the lieutenant knew what the first guard thought
she -smelled in the beverage.

They could have been influenced

by that knowledge, and unwittingly or otherwise, confirmed
this suspicion out of suggestion, presumption, peer influence
or security zealousness.

So the notion that the first guard's

findings were corroborated by the two other guards falls short
of the level of persuasiveness

required by the clear and

convincing standard of proof.
Moreover, another occupant of the car with the grievant
also had a cup containing a beverage.

But his drink could not

be determined by the guard to contain alcohol.
of that circumstance raise doubts.

Certain aspects

In addition to pointing

out the unscientific nature of the procedure, I think it doubtful that the grievant would have alcohol mixed with his soft
drink and his companion would not.

More significantly, the

distinctions between the two drinks, which resulted in the
grievant's discharge and the imposition of no discipline on his
companion, could mean, unless determined unquest ionably that
the grievant's beverage contained alcohol and his companion's
did not, that employees apparently similarly situated were
disciplined differently.

To avoid that proscribed and discrim-

inatory result the Company should have had a better evidentiary
system to determine the contents of the grievant's cup and
beverage.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
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The discharge of Gary Young on September
28, 1981 was not for just cause. He
shall be reinstated with back pay, less
his earning's from gainful employment,
if any, during the period of his discharge,

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 28, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss>
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO
and

AWARD OF ARBITRATORS
Case #1330 1176 81

Hercules, Incorporated

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties make the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated June 16, 1981
on behalf of the Commercial Department is
arbitrable. A hearing on the merits of
the grievance shall be scheduled.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Edward Zinser
Concurring

I. Lee Holt
Dissenting
DATED: July 6, 1982
(STATE OF
New York)gs .
jCOUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
iithis instrument which is my AWARD.
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DATED: July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982

I, Edward Zinser do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED:
July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1982
)
ss
)

I, I. Lee Holt do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1176
81

Hercules, Incorporated
The issue is:
Whether the Union's grievance dated June
16, 1981, from the Commercial Department
is arbitrable?
A hearing was held in Kingston, New York on February 19,
1982 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Undersigned served as Chairman of the tripartite Board of
Arbitration.

Messrs. I. Lee Holt and Fred J. Privitera served

respectively as the Company and Union designees on the Board of
Arbitration.

Later, for the meeting and deliberations of the

Board, Mr. Edward Zinser replaced Mr. Privitera. A stenographic

record of the hearing was taken; the Arbitrator's Oath was waived;
the parties filed post-hearing briefs; and the Board of Arbitration met on June 25, 1982.
The Company claims that the grievance is not arbitrable
because the Union's demand for arbitration was not given to the
Company within the fifteen (15) calendar days required under
Section V(f-l) of the contract following the Works Manager's
written answer to the grievance.
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Said contract provision reads:
If the grievance is not settled by the application of paragraph (d) above and paragraph
(e) in cases of discharge, it shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
procedure and conditions provided in the arbitration clause hereinafter set forth. A written
notice of such demand shall be given to the
Company by the Union within fifteen (15) calendar days after the receipt of a written answer
of the Works Manager or his designated representative or the grievance shall be considered
settled on the basis of the final answer by
the Company.
The record shows that the written answer of the Works
Manager was delivered to a representative of the Local Union on
June 22, 1981.

The Company argues that the Union's demand for

arbitration was submitted to the Company by letter from a staff
representative of the International Union dated July 13, 1981,
received by the Company on July 15, 1981, and therefore in excess
of the 15 calendar days prescribed by the contract.
If the Union's letter of July 13, 1981 was all that the
Union did to notify the Company of its intent to arbitrate this
dispute, I would find the grievance barred from arbitration by
the contract time limits, especially in view of the explicit
language of the foregoing contract clause that if the time limit
is not met:

"the grievance shall be considered settled
on the basis of the final answer by the
Company."
But, by an earlier latter dated June 26, 1981 the Union informed
the Company of the appointment of the Union's arbitrator on "the
pending layoff grievances." It is undisputed that the reference
to "the pending layoff grievances" involved the instant case.
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That letter was unquestionably within the 15 calendar days of
the answer of the Works Manager.

In my view that letter suf-

ficiently informed the Company of the Union's intent to arbitrate this grievance and as such constituted adequate notice
and compliance with the 15 day time limit.
The grievance and arbitration provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, and particular time limits thereof are to
be complied with. But they are not common law pleadings requiring absolute precision as to form.

The intent is to bring about

expeditious processing of grievances and submissions to arbitration.

The objective is to give notice of an arbitration so as

to prevent unreasonable delays and prejudice resulting therefrom,

and to preclude false beliefs that a grievance had been abandoned.
The Union's letter of June 26, 1981, notifying the Company of the
Union's Arbitrator in this dispute met that intent and objective.
Significant to my mind is the fact that the parties have
had few arbitration cases during their collective bargaining
relationship.

So they have had little practice with the contract

arbitration procedures and little experience with the time limits
and form of giving notice of an intent to arbitrate. There is

no history or even a claim that the Union has previously neglected

to follow or abused the proper procedures, which would warrant the

Company's present insistence on strict compliance with the form of
a demand for arbitration.
Even assuming the accuracy of the Company's claim that the
Union's letter of June 26th naming its arbitrator was merely a

-4"ploy" to pressure the Company into a settlement, it does not mean
that that letter could not and did not serve also as a notice to
the Company that the Union wanted to arbitrate the dispute if a
settlement was not achieved.

Indeed, a regular demand for arbi-

tration by the Union on or about the same date could have been
construed by the Company as as much a "ploy" as the Union's letter
naming its arbitrator.
In short, under the particular circumstances of this case,
I conclude that the intent of the 15 calendar day time limit was
satisfied and that the Company received timely notice from the
Union of a demand for arbitration within the meaning of Section V
(f-1) of the contract. Accordingly the grievance is arbitrable.
However this may not be construed by the Union as a license to
process future grievances to arbitration in any manner other than
as precisely required by the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

